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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 In the fanfare that surrounded the announcement of the National 
Security Entry-Exit Registration System,1 Attorney General John 
Ashcroft’s comment that the Department of Justice (DOJ) would ask 
state and local police to enforce both civil and criminal immigration 
laws seemed like an afterthought. State authorities, DOJ concluded, 
                                                                                                                      
 * Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia; A.B., Harvard Col-
lege, 1992; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1996. I am grateful to Kevin Johnson and Jay Krish-
nan for their insightful comments on an earlier draft of this Article that I presented at the 
Second Joint Conference of the Asian Pacific American Law Faculty and Western Regional 
Law Teachers of Color. I also appreciate the thoughtful suggestions I received from Phil 
Hwang, Joseph Thai, Jeffrey Wu, Jonathan Lipson, and Sylvia Lazos, as well as from my 
colleagues at the University of Missouri-Columbia: Hank Chambers, Melody Daily, Larry 
Dessem, Ilhyung Lee, Phil Peters, Richard Reuben, and Jennifer Robbennolt. Finally, I 
would like to thank Tim Peters for his thorough research assistance. 
 1. The National Security Entry-Exit Registration System [hereinafter N-SEERS] re-
quires nonimmigrant males sixteen years or older from certain countries (mostly Arab and 
Muslim countries) to register with the federal government. See infra notes 35-42 and ac-
companying text.  
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have “inherent authority” as sovereign entities to enforce these laws, 
though Ashcroft was careful to limit this invitation to local participa-
tion only to “our narrow anti-terrorism mission.”2 
 But to attorneys, law enforcement officers, and others working in 
the immigration field, Ashcroft’s announcement was a bombshell. 
Not only was DOJ’s announced position a reversal from previous le-
gal positions taken by the Department (and a departure from exist-
ing legal precedent), but the announcement, if put into effect, raises 
many fundamental questions. If local authorities do indeed have “in-
herent authority” to enforce federal immigration laws, would they 
need any legislative authorization (federal or state) to do so? Would 
their inherent authority be limited only to the immigration law en-
forcement that advances the “narrow anti-terrorism mission” that At-
torney General Ashcroft proposed, or could local authorities expand 
their enforcement to all immigration laws? And what result if local 
authorities, declining to exercise their inherent authority, choose not 
to enforce immigration laws?  
 Answering these questions requires a fundamental examination 
of the scope of the immigration power and more specifically, consid-
eration of the constitutional barriers to local enforcement. However, 
the current debate about local enforcement has largely focused on 
policy effectiveness and the legal issue of preemption. In the legal de-
bate, courts have focused on preemption analysis—determining what 
role, if any, Congress intended for local authorities to have in the en-
forcement of immigration laws.3 In the policy debate, advocates and 
opponents of local enforcement have disagreed fiercely about its ef-
fectiveness. Advocates argue that local enforcement is necessary to 
plug up the holes in the nation’s immigration system that became so 
painfully apparent after 9/11.4 Opponents counter that local enforce-
ment will lead to less, not more, effective law enforcement as immi-
grant communities become distrustful of local police departments and 
                                                                                                                      
 2. Attorney General John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks on the National Security En-
try-Exit Registration System (June 6, 2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2002/ 
060502agpreparedremarks.htm (last visited March 19, 2004) [hereinafter Ashcroft Re-
marks on N-SEERS].  N-SEERS will eventually be subsumed by US-VISIT, an automated 
entry-exit system applicable to all nonimmigrant visitors to the United States. See infra 
note 36. 
 3. Most courts (and DOJ itself before its recent policy reversal) have treated immi-
gration law enforcement as the exclusive province of the federal government, but the cir-
cuits have disagreed about whether any exceptions for local enforcement exist. See infra 
Part II, notes 57-78 and accompanying text.  
 4. Advocates like FAIR (Federation for American Immigration Reform) argue that 
local enforcement is good policy because local police who are already out patrolling Ameri-
can cities and towns will be able to increase multi-fold the manpower available to enforce 
immigration laws. See infra Part II, notes 31-42 and accompanying text.  
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less willing to report crimes or cooperate in criminal investigations.5  
 Though preemption and policy effectiveness are important issues, 
a more fundamental consideration, and one that has been overlooked 
in the current debate, is the constitutional barrier to local enforce-
ment. The immigration power, as derived from specific constitutional 
powers and from the U.S.’s status as a sovereign entity, must be ex-
ercised uniformly. This power, because of its effect on foreign policy, 
must be exercised exclusively and uniformly at the federal level.6  
 But DOJ’s position, because of its voluntary nature and the ex-
pansive discretion it gives to local officials, will necessarily violate 
the constitutional requirement of uniform immigration laws. DOJ’s 
inherent authority position strongly suggests that local authorities 
may enforce immigration laws without requiring any legislative au-
thorization (either federal or state) and without being restricted to 
enforcing a subset of the immigration laws, as Attorney General 
Ashcroft has requested.7  
 And most disturbing for the constitutional mandate for uniform 
immigration laws, DOJ’s position allows local officials to decide, in 
the first instance, whether to participate at all; those local officials 
who do decide to participate are subject to different state laws affect-
ing their arrest authority. The result is that federal immigration 
laws will be enforced differently from state to state and even from 
town to town. This “thousand borders” problem flies in the face of the 
constitutional mandate for immigration uniformity.  
 In Part II, I explain the evolution of DOJ’s inherent authority po-
sition. I start by examining the norm among local authorities of not 
enforcing immigration law and then explore the policy reasons why 
these authorities have chosen nonenforcement. Next I discuss past 
attempts at local enforcement and the legal and political obstacles 
that they encountered. I conclude by explaining how the inherent au-
thority position, with its emphasis on voluntary participation, at-
tempts (with mixed results) to avoid these obstacles. 
 In Part III, I lay out the theoretical framework for my thesis: that 
the immigration power is an exclusively federal power that must be 
exercised uniformly. Courts and scholars alike trace the immigration 
power to two sources: several specific constitutional provisions (in-
cluding the Naturalization Clause) and the authority that the U.S. 
government exercises as a sovereign entity.8 These sources establish 
                                                                                                                      
 5. See infra Part II, notes 15-18, 79-109 and accompanying text; see also Kevin R. 
Johnson, September 11 and Mexican Immigrants: Collateral Damage Comes Home, 52 
DEPAUL L. REV. 849, 863-64 (arguing that the involvement of local police in immigration 
law enforcement may be one of the most significant and negative results of 9/11).  
 6. See infra Part III, notes 113-62 and accompanying text.  
 7. See Ashcroft Remarks on N-SEERS, supra note 2. 
 8. See infra Part III, notes 113-27 and accompanying text.  
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a uniform, exclusively federal immigration power. The immigration 
power must be exercised exclusively by the federal government be-
cause of the link between immigration and foreign policy. And the 
immigration power must be exercised uniformly because of the need 
for the nation to speak with one voice on foreign policy matters.9 
Courts have struck down state law immigration legislation because 
of these same uniformity and foreign policy concerns. Because non-
uniform enforcement has the same effect as nonuniform policy, non-
uniform enforcement is also constitutionally prohibited.10 
 In Part IV, I seek to demonstrate that DOJ’s invitation to local 
authorities to enforce immigration laws violates the constitutional 
mandate for uniform immigration laws. Looking at the very different 
reactions among local authorities to DOJ’s proposal (some have ea-
gerly embraced local enforcement while others have passed laws 
strictly limiting this enforcement), I argue that allowing local au-
thorities to choose whether to enforce immigration laws will result in 
patchwork enforcement, even within the same state. And even if all 
local authorities within a state agree to enforce immigration laws, 
their enforcement will likely be different from enforcement in a 
neighboring state because local authorities are subject to different 
state laws affecting their authority to make arrests.11 Taken to-
gether, these inconsistencies violate the constitutional requirement 
for uniform immigration laws and make DOJ’s invitation for local en-
forcement unconstitutional. 
II.   THE EVOLUTION OF THE INHERENT AUTHORITY POSITION 
 Though its announcement surprised attorneys, law enforcement, 
and others working in the immigration field, the structure of the in-
herent authority position is not surprising, given the context of local 
enforcement of immigration laws. As explained below, the issue of lo-
cal enforcement has had a complicated history, confronting the pit-
falls of legal preemption and political opposition. DOJ’s position then, 
with its invitational structure and its inherent authority premise, at-
tempts to maneuver around these pitfalls to achieve its goal of local 
enforcement. 
A.   Norm of Nonenforcement 
 Except for limited instances, the majority of local law enforcement 
officials do not enforce federal immigration laws. These local officials 
may likely follow procedures similar to that of the Houston Police 
Department: officers do not arrest or detain people solely on the be-
                                                                                                                      
 9. See infra Part III, notes 128-49 and accompanying text.  
 10. See infra Part III, notes 150-61 and accompanying text.   
 11. See infra Part IV, notes 163-89 and accompanying text.  
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lief that they are illegally present in the country.12 And if a Houston 
officer stops someone for a nonimmigration violation (e.g., a traffic 
stop), the officer is prohibited from asking about the person’s immi-
gration status.13 Only if the person is arrested on a criminal charge 
more serious than a Class C misdemeanor and the officer knows that 
the person is in the country illegally may the officer contact federal 
immigration authorities.14  
 The nonenforcement policy of these local authorities may be the 
result of one or several factors: (1) a statute or ordinance that prohib-
its such enforcement;15 (2) a policy decision by law enforcement de-
partments not to damage their relationship with immigrant commu-
nities, damage that could harm their ability to fight crime;16 or (3) a 
pragmatic decision by law enforcement officials to concentrate their 
scarce resources on violence and other crimes that immediately affect 
the safety of their communities, leaving the enforcement of immigra-
tion violations to the federal government.17 Some of these nonen-
                                                                                                                      
 12. Sam Nuchia, Chief of Police, Houston Police Department, General Order to the 
Houston Police Department (June 25, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter Nuchia Or-
der]; see also Peggy O’Hare, HPD Policy on Aliens Is Hands-Off / Status of Immigrants 
Viewed as Federal Issue, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 3, 2003, at 15 [hereinafter O’Hare, Mar. 3, 
2003], 2003 WL 3241310; Peggy O’Hare, ‘Sanctuary’ Policy Irks Some in HPD / Accused 
Killer Helped by ‘Hands-Offs’ Proviso, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 8, 2003, at 31 [hereinafter 
O’Hare, Mar. 8, 2003], 2003 WL 3242562. 
 13. See Nuchia Order, supra note 12; see also O’Hare, Mar. 3, 2003, supra note 12; 
O’Hare, Mar. 8, 2003, supra note 12. 
 14. See Nuchia Order, supra note 12. Under Texas law, a class C misdemeanor is pun-
ishable by fine only. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.41 (Vernon 2003). Examples of Class C 
misdemeanors include possession of alcohol on public school grounds (see TEX. EDUC. CODE 
ANN. § 37.122 (Vernon 1996)) and a minor’s operation of a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol (see TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 106.041 (Vernon 2003)). 
 15. For example, in January 2003 Seattle’s city council unanimously passed an ordi-
nance that prohibits police and other municipal workers from stopping people or checking 
their identification solely to determine their immigration status.  The ordinance strength-
ens a 1991 policy that had applied only to police officers. Seattle Adopts “Don’t Ask” Police 
Policy on Immigration, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 28, 2003, 06:56:00, WESTLAW, Allnews-
plus Database. 
 16. Houston’s policy, discussed above, seems to be motivated mostly by concerns that 
the police maintain a cooperative relationship with immigrant communities. “Without the 
assurances they will not be deported, many illegal immigrants with critical information 
would not come forward,” said Craig Ferrell, deputy director and administrative general 
counsel for the Houston Police Department (HPD) Chief’s Command Legal Services. 
Ferrell further noted that, “Police depend on the cooperation of immigrant communities to 
help them solve all sorts of crimes and to maintain public order.” O’Hare, Mar. 3, 2003, su-
pra note 12. The HPD policy itself states, “[W]e must rely upon the cooperation of all per-
sons, including citizens, documented aliens, and undocumented aliens, in our effort to 
maintain public order and combat crime.” Nuchia Order, supra note 12. 
 17. Many smaller police departments, while not disputing the policy wisdom of local 
enforcement, have expressed skepticism about the resources required. Mark Brewer, legal 
adviser for the Lake County, Florida, Sheriff’s Office, described DOJ’s proposal as “an un-
funded mandate. Now law-enforcement officers who should be looking for burglars and 
robbers are going to be looking for illegal aliens, with no additional monies for deputies 
coming down.” Pedro Ruz Gutierrez, Some Police Eager to Help INS Agents; Sheriffs in Or-
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forcement policies predate the events of 9/11, but some were imple-
mented in specific response to DOJ’s invitation and other pressures 
for local enforcement of immigration laws.18 
B.   Instances of Local Enforcement 
 The local authorities who have taken up DOJ’s invitation for local 
enforcement have done so, for the most part, informally. For exam-
ple, in Northampton, Pennsylvania, District Attorney John Morgan-
elli has instructed his office to investigate and arrest undocumented 
immigrants in the county.19 And in Washington County, Utah, the 
sheriff’s department arrests people for immigration violations.20 Nei-
ther of these law enforcement agencies makes immigration arrests 
pursuant to a formal policy or with the sanction of a state or local or-
dinance; rather, the agencies do so at the direction of their head law 
enforcement officer.21 
 The most prominent exception to this pattern of informal en-
forcement is the state of Florida, which entered into a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) with DOJ that authorizes thirty-five Flor-
ida state and local law enforcement officers to conduct immigration-
related functions, such as making warrantless arrests of illegal 
aliens.22 Under the MOU, which originally lasted from July 2, 2002 
until September 1, 2003,23 the Florida officers work under federal su-
pervision24 but continue to be paid by their local departments.25  
 Though the federal legislation authorizing such MOUs was added 
                                                                                                                      
ange and Seminole Want to Make Immigration Arrests, but Smaller Agencies Don’t, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 5, 2002, at A1, 2002 WL 3039779. The federal CLEAR Act (Clear 
Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal), introduced by Representative Charlie 
Norwood and still pending as of the publication date of this Article, seeks to encourage lo-
cal enforcement by providing $1 billion in federal funding each fiscal year to those local au-
thorities who take up the task of immigration enforcement. H.R. 2671, 108th Cong. (2003). 
The CLEAR Act is discussed in more detail, infra note 56. 
 18. See, e.g., Seattle Adopts “Don’t Ask” Police Policy on Immigration, supra note 15.  
 19. Tyra Braden, District Attorney Seeks to Crack Down on Illegal Immigrants, North-
ampton County Prosecutor Blames INS for Problems, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, Nov. 14, 
2002, at B7, 2002 WL 101913084.  
 20. Tim Sullivan, Should Police, Deputies Help INS Enforce the Law?, SALT LAKE 
TRIB., Aug. 26, 2002, at D3, 2002 WL 4267638. 
 21. Braden, supra note 19; Sullivan, supra note 20. 
 22. Memorandum of Understanding Between the INS and the State of Florida (July 
26, 2002), reprinted in 79 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1138, app. II at 1140 (2002) [hereinafter 
Florida MOU]. These officers were trained by the INS and then placed in Florida’s seven 
Regional Domestic Security Task Forces. Id. at 1140-41. 
 23. This MOU expired without renewal, but Florida is considering signing another 
MOU. Interview by Timothy Peters with Jose Luis Rodriguez, Office of Florida Governor 
Jeb Bush (Dec. 2, 2003). 
 24. Florida MOU, supra note 22, at 1143. 
 25. Id. at 1142. 
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in 1996,26 Florida was the first entity to actually sign an MOU with 
the federal government. In 1998, Salt Lake City considered signing 
an MOU but dropped the idea after fierce political protests from La-
tino groups concerned about racial profiling.27 Even in the post 9/11 
period where Florida’s special vulnerability to terrorism attacks be-
came apparent,28 Florida was careful to limit the authority of its offi-
cers to “counter-terrorism and domestic security goals.”29 South Caro-
lina and Alabama have also expressed interest in signing similar 
MOUs.30 
C.   Potential Efficiencies of Local Enforcement 
 On its face, the proposal outlined by Attorney General Ashcroft for 
local participation in the enforcement of immigration laws seems like 
a practical way to address a complicated problem: how to effectively 
patrol the vast U.S. borders and stem the rising tide of illegal immi-
gration. After 9/11, the problem took on more urgent security dimen-
sions, as the holes in the U.S. immigration system became apparent. 
Americans were dismayed to discover that of the nineteen terrorists, 
at least ten were in the United States in violation of U.S. immigra-
tion laws.31 
 Seized by the understandable fear of future terrorist attacks, the 
American public clamored for tighter control of the country’s borders 
and better tabs kept on those visitors who are lawfully admitted. In 
response, the Bush administration proposed a series of major 
changes to the U.S. immigration system. The most dramatic change, 
enacted under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, removed the Im-
                                                                                                                      
 26. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1)-(3) (2000) (authorizing states and localities to enter into 
memorandums of understanding with DOJ to jointly enforce immigration laws).  
 27. Mary Beth Sheridan, Plan to Have Police in Florida Help INS Stirs Rights Debate; 
Activists Say Immigrants’ Trust at Issue, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2002, at A17, 2002 WL 
15844763. 
 28. Of the nineteen hijackers, thirteen spent time in Florida, getting Florida drivers’ 
licenses and attending flight training school there. That its governor, Jeb Bush, is the 
brother of the President also makes Florida stand out as a target for future terrorist at-
tacks. See Florida Plan for Cooperation in Immigration Law Enforcement Is Model for the 
Rest of the Nation, Says FAIR, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Mar. 5, 2002, 2002 WL 4575001. 
 29. Florida MOU, supra note 22, at 1138.  
 30. See Jeffrey McMurray, Alabama Troopers Begin Basic Training in Immigration 
Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, May 20, 2003, 18:10:00, WESTLAW, Allnewsplus, 
Database; Press Release, South Carolina Attorney General’s Office, Condon Tells Ashcroft 
that South Carolina Is ‘Ready to Assist’ in Illegal Immigration Fight (Oct. 15, 2001) (on file 
with author).  
 31. These violations included obtaining a visa under false pretenses, being granted a 
visa despite a woefully inadequate visa application, and overstaying an otherwise valid 
visa. See, e.g., Steven A. Camarota, How the Terrorists Get In, PUB. INT., Oct. 1, 2002, at 
6578, 2002 WL 5720087; Michelle Malkin, Dismissing the Dangers of Illegal Immigration, 
INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Sept. 2, 2002, at 46, 2002 WL 8339102; Douglas Pasternak, A Wel-
come Mat for Terrorists, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 8, 2001, at 31, 2001 WL 30366038. 
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migration and Naturalization Service (INS) from the Department of 
Justice and placed it under the Department of Homeland Security.32 
 Furthermore, INS’s dual functions of law enforcement and immi-
gration services were split. The newly created Bureau of Citizenship 
and Immigration Services (BCIS) is now responsible for immigration 
services like the processing of citizenship applications. The enforce-
ment functions of INS are now split between the Bureau of Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement (BICE—responsible for investiga-
tions, detentions, and removal) and the Bureau of Customs and Bor-
der Protection (BCBP—responsible for point of entry inspections and 
border patrol), both of which are under the Division of Border & 
Transportation Security (BTS) and answer to Undersecretary Asa 
Hutchinson.33 In the post 9/11 environment, both pro-immigration 
and restrictionist groups agree that immigration enforcement will 
take precedence over immigration services under this new struc-
ture.34 
 The task that BTS faces is formidable. In addition to inheriting 
the enforcement responsibilities that INS had before 9/11, BTS is 
also responsible for enforcing the flurry of measures that DOJ an-
nounced post 9/11. Many of these measures were already mandated 
under current law but had never been enforced. Perhaps most con-
troversially, DOJ resurrected the requirement that all aliens be reg-
istered and fingerprinted,35 tweaked it, and renamed it the National 
Security Entry-Exit Registration System (N-SEERS).  
 Under N-SEERS,36 nonimmigrant males sixteen years or older 
from certain countries (mostly Arab and Muslim countries) are re-
                                                                                                                      
 32. Stanley Mailman & Stephen Yale-Loehr, Immigration Law: Immigration in a 
Homeland Security Regime, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 23, 2002, at 3, available at WESTLAW, 
12/23/2002 N.Y. L.J. 3.  
 33. Judith Golub, Is Homeland Security Our Security Blanket?, IMMIGR. L. TODAY, 
Mar./Apr. 2003, at 15, 21. There have been previous calls to separate the enforcement and 
service functions of INS. In 1997, the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform (appointed 
by Congress to study immigration and naturalization policy) proposed a reorganization 
along those lines. See U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, BECOMING AN 
AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANT POLICY 148-83 (1997), available at 
http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/reports.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2004).  
 34. See Philip Shenon, For Immigrants, the Watchword Suddenly Is Enforcement, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002, § 4, at 4, LEXIS, News Library, NYT File. 
 35. Noncitizens who are fourteen years or older and remain in the United States for 
thirty days or more are required to register and be fingerprinted. Immigration and Nation-
ality Act § 262, 8 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000). Before 9/11, registration and fingerprinting were 
waived for most groups except for nationals of Iraq, Iran, Sudan, and Libya. See Press Re-
lease, Department of Justice, National Security Entry-Exit Registration System 1-2 (June 
5, 2002) (citing to 8 C.F.R. § 264.1(f) (2003)) [hereinafter N-SEERS Press Release]. The age 
for required registration under N-SEERS is sixteen, compared with fourteen under federal 
law. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 262, 8 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000). 
 36. DOJ has extended the registration requirements to include all nonimmigrants vis-
iting the United States. This new electronic system, called U.S. Visitor and Immigrant 
Status Indication Technology (US-VISIT), records certain physical attributes of visitors 
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quired to register at their port-of-entry into the United States or, if 
they entered before N-SEERS went into effect, register with their lo-
cal immigration office.37 These aliens must also report before leaving 
the country38 and, like all noncitizens, inform immigration authori-
ties within ten days if they move to a different address.39 Failure to 
abide by these requirements would be a criminal violation; the alien 
would be listed in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) 
system40 and be subject to fines, incarceration, and deportation.41 
 In this context of increased enforcement responsibilities, DOJ’s 
proposal makes sense. State and local law enforcement, who are al-
ready out on “the beat” in America’s cities and towns, could assist 
BTS with its gargantuan task of enforcing N-SEERS and other im-
                                                                                                                      
(e.g., fingerprints or iris scans) when they enter and leave the U.S. See Press Release, 
State Department, New U.S. Entry-Exit System Aims to Enhance Security—Department 
of Homeland Security Fact Sheet and Frequently Asked Questions on US-VISIT (Jan. 5, 
2004), 2004 WL 59149150 [hereinafter US-VISIT Press Release].  
 37. The list of countries originally subject to N-SEERS included the four countries re-
quired to register before 9/11 (Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Sudan), as well as Syria, Afghanistan, 
Algeria, Bahrain, Eritrea, Lebanon, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Tuni-
sia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. See Statement, U.S. Department of Justice, Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service, INS Reminds Certain Temporary Foreign Visitors of 
Eighteen Countries of Registration Requirement (Dec. 6, 2002), http://uscis.gov/graphics/ 
publicaffairs/statements/ReminderState.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2004). Pakistan and 
Saudi Arabia, two important American allies, were conspicuously left off the original list 
and were only added in December 2002. See Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens 
from Designated Countries, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,136 (Dec. 16, 2002), 2002 WL 31785000.  
 When N-SEERS initially went into effect, these nonimmigrant males were also required 
to report to immigration authorities annually with proof of (1) residence and (2) employ-
ment or educational enrollment. See N-SEERS Press Release, supra note 35, at 4. The an-
nual interview requirement has now been suspended. See US-VISIT Press Release, supra 
note 36. 
 38. See N-SEERS Press Release, supra note 35, at 4. 
 39. Id.; see also Jonathan Peterson, Noncitizens Must Report if They Move Immigra-
tion: The Justice Department, Citing a 50-Year-Old Law, Demands Notification Within 10 
Days of Moving. Penalty Could Be Deportation, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 2002, at A1, 2002 WL 
2491756; Immigration and Nationality Act § 265, 8 U.S.C. § 1305 (2000) (requiring all non-
citizens required to register to provide change of address information to the Attorney Gen-
eral within ten days of moving). 
 40. The NCIC is a computer database maintained by the FBI that contains criminal 
justice information (criminal record history information, fugitives, stolen properties, and 
missing persons). NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER, FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/is/ncic.htm (last modified April 8, 
2003). 
 41. N-SEERS Press Release, supra note 35, at 4. N-SEERS has been strongly criti-
cized as a misguided example of racial profiling and an ineffective and poorly administered 
anti-terrorism mechanism, resulting in mistaken arrests and inconsistent enforcement 
among different immigration offices. See Rachel Swarns & Christopher Drew, Fearful, An-
gry or Confused, Muslim Immigrants Register, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2003, at A1, LEXIS, 
News Library, NYT File. Some of the men who were detained for deportation had applied 
for permanent residency through a one-time visa offered in 2001; these men showed up for 
registration mistakenly expecting that they would be granted leniency because they were 
in the process of adjusting their immigration status. See Immigration Guidelines “Trap” 
Muslims, DAILY PRESS (Va.), Apr. 30, 2003, at C6, 2003 WL 19285551.  
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migration laws. Local enforcement would add sorely needed man-
power and, though it would have some financial costs to the local de-
partments, it would be cheaper than hiring more federal officers 
solely dedicated to immigration enforcement. In announcing the N-
SEERS system, Attorney General Ashcroft described his vision of lo-
cal enforcement in specific terms: during traffic stops and other rou-
tine encounters, local officers would check the National Crime Infor-
mation Center system (a system they check regularly) and arrest the 
alien if he is listed as violating civil or criminal immigration laws (in-
cluding the aforementioned registration laws).42 
 But the issue of local enforcement is more complicated than just 
the advantage of potential efficiencies in the wake of national secu-
rity concerns. Even prior to 9/11, courts, law enforcement agencies, 
and Congress struggled to define the line between federal and local 
authority in immigration law enforcement. As described below, they 
did not reach the same answers, and the answers they did reach were 
largely unworkable or susceptible to legal or political challenge.  
 In large part then, the inherent authority doctrine is an attempt 
to avoid these legal and political pitfalls. The gist of the doctrine, ac-
cording to DOJ sources, is that states and localities are “sovereign 
entities” with “inherent authority” to enforce immigration laws.43 In 
its opinion, DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel purportedly cites to as au-
thority United States v. Salinas-Calderon.44 In Salinas-Calderon, the 
Tenth Circuit upheld the defendant’s conviction for knowing trans-
port of illegal aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). In a foot-
note, the court dismissed the defendant’s arguments that the state 
trooper who stopped the defendant, for erratic driving, did not have 
authority to detain the defendant and his passengers while the 
trooper inquired into federal immigration matters.45 “A state trooper,” 
                                                                                                                      
 42. Ashcroft Remarks on N-SEERS, supra note 2. 
 43. Marcus Stern & Mark Arner, Police May Gain Power to Enforce Immigration; 
Plan Has Local Officers, Rights Groups on Edge, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 3, 2002, at 
A1, 2002 WL 4594382. 
 44. 728 F.2d 1298 (10th Cir. 1984). DOJ, to date, has not released the Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC) opinion, so it is not possible to confirm the basis for, or the scope of, the 
opinion. In April 2003, a coalition of immigrant rights and civil rights groups (including 
National Council of La Raza) filed a federal lawsuit against DOJ, seeking disclosure of the 
OLC opinion. See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Seeks Disclosure 
of “Secret Law” on Local Police Enforcement of Federal Immigration Laws (Apr. 14, 2003), 
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=12358&c=206. 
 45. The trooper asked the defendant for a driver’s license and then for a green card, 
neither of which the defendant had. Salinas-Calderon, 728 F.2d at 1299. Defendant’s wife, 
who was also in the truck, explained that her husband was from Mexico, did not speak 
English, and did not have a driver’s license. She further explained that the six passengers 
in the back of the truck were also from Mexico. Id. at 1299-1300. The trooper called an INS 
agent who read the Miranda warnings in Spanish to the defendant and his passengers. 
The trooper then arrested the defendant for knowingly transporting aliens in violation of 8 
U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). Id. at 1300.  
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the Tenth Circuit held, “has general investigatory authority to in-
quire into possible immigration violations.”46 
 As I discuss below, an assertion by local authorities that they 
have inherent authority to enforce federal immigration laws raises 
numerous questions.47 Assuming though that states and localities do 
have inherent authority to enforce immigration laws, then support-
ers of DOJ’s position would argue that those states and localities 
may do so without having to grapple with the complicated questions 
of Congressional preemption discussed below. Moreover, because the 
authority is “inherent,” local authorities may arguably enforce immi-
gration laws without requiring legislative action, action that might 
spark political opposition. 
D.   Why an Invitation? Tenth Amendment Constraints 
 Before launching into an analysis of the inherent authority posi-
tion itself, it is important to understand why DOJ has structured its 
position as an invitation to local enforcement, rather than as a man-
date.48 Simply stated, the Tenth Amendment would prohibit such a 
mandate.49 As interpreted by the Supreme Court in New York v. 
United States50 and Printz v. United States,51 the Tenth Amendment 
is violated by federal legislation that commandeers the machinery of 
the states. “The Federal Government may neither issue directives 
requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command 
the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to admin-
ister or enforce a federal regulatory program.”52 
 Requiring local authorities to enforce federal immigration laws 
would be precisely the sort of federal commandeering prohibited by 
                                                                                                                      
 46. Id. at 1301 n.3. Other courts have cited to Salinas-Calderon in upholding local en-
forcement of immigration laws. See infra note 78.  
 47. See infra notes 57-109 and accompanying text.  
 48. In remarks to the International Association of Chiefs of Police Conference, Attor-
ney General Ashcroft was careful to describe his request for local enforcement of immigra-
tion laws as a request. “This assistance is entirely voluntary–if state and local officials do 
not wish to assist us in arresting violators of federal immigration laws, they are free to 
choose not to.” Attorney General John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks for the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police Conference (Oct. 7, 2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/ 
2002/100702chiefsofpolicemn1.htm [hereinafter Ashcroft Remarks for Chiefs of Police]. 
 49. The Tenth Amendment states that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States re-
spectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 50. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress lacked authority, the Court struck 
down the provision in the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 
that required states to “take title” of nuclear waste generated within their borders or to 
enact legislation to dispose of the waste). 
 51. 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress went beyond its authority in the Brady 
Handgun Violence Prevention Act in requiring local law enforcement to determine whether 
a proposed gun sale would violate federal law). 
 52. Id. at 935. 
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New York and Printz. Local authorities, though employees of the 
state or its political subdivisions, would be compelled to enforce the 
federal immigration program.53 The concerns about accountability 
that the Supreme Court expressed in New York and Printz would 
also be applicable here: local authorities who are enforcing the immi-
gration laws would bear the brunt of any public disapproval, while 
the federal officials who actually created the laws would be insu-
lated.54 Moreover, local authorities would be required to absorb the 
costs of immigration enforcement, while federal officials could claim 
the credit cost-free.55 
 Arguably, the accountability concerns are still present if local au-
thorities take up DOJ’s invitation to enforce immigration laws (or are 
enticed by federal funds to do so), but federal encouragement of state 
action that stops short of coercion is constitutionally permissible.56 
Thus, DOJ’s proposal must be structured as an invitation to local law 
enforcement to pass Tenth Amendment muster.  
E.   Preemption: The Legal Quagmire 
 Existing legal authorities that have considered the question of lo-
cal enforcement have focused almost exclusively on a preemption 
analysis: did Congress intend for local enforcement of immigration 
laws and, if so, to what extent? While acknowledging that federal au-
thority over immigration is plenary, most courts have carved out a 
role for local enforcement as well.57 On the assumption that Congress 
may allow local enforcement of immigration laws, courts and other 
authorities have used a preemption analysis to determine the appro-
                                                                                                                      
 53. See id. 
 54. See New York, 505 U.S. at 169 (“Accountability is thus diminished when, due to 
federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views of the 
local electorate . . . .”). 
 55. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 930 (“By forcing state governments to absorb the financial 
burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take 
credit for ‘solving’ problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solu-
tions with higher federal taxes.”). 
 56. See New York, 505 U.S. at 166. Thus, it appears that the CLEAR Act (Clear Law 
Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal), as proposed by Representative Norwood, was 
drafted with the 10th Amendment in mind: the Act does not require local authorities to en-
force immigration laws, but rather, ties federal funding to that enforcement. H.R. 2671, 
108th Cong. §§ 101, 106 (2003); see supra note 17. The Act requires states who receive fed-
eral reimbursement under section 241(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(i)) for the detention of criminal aliens (known as SCAAP or the State Criminal 
Alien Assistance Program) or who want to receive additional federal funds available under 
the CLEAR Act to pass laws permitting local enforcement of immigration laws. H.R. 2671. 
The Supreme Court has approved similar types of tie-ins as a valid exercise of Congress’ 
spending power. See S. Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding constitutionality of 
a statute conditioning state receipt of federal highway funds on adoption of minimum 
drinking age). 
 57. See, e.g., Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled in part 
on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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priate line between federal and local action. But courts have reached 
substantively different answers and, as explained below, the answers 
are largely inconsistent and unworkable, resulting in a legal quag-
mire. 
F.   Civil v. Criminal Immigration Laws 
 A common position, one taken by the Ninth Circuit and, until re-
cently, the Department of Justice, is that local police may enforce 
criminal, but not civil, provisions of the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Act (INA).58 
 Applying a traditional preemption analysis, the Ninth Circuit in 
Gonzales v. City of Peoria held that because the civil provisions of the 
INA constitute such a pervasive regulatory scheme, local enforce-
ment of the civil laws must be preempted.59 By contrast, because the 
criminal provisions of the INA are so “few in number and relatively 
simple in their terms,” the Ninth Circuit concluded that there is 
room for concurrent local enforcement of these provisions.60 
 Citing to Gonzales, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in a 1996 
opinion letter made the same civil/criminal distinction.61 Noting that 
federal law imposes significant restrictions on even federal enforce-
ment of civil immigration laws,62 the OLC concluded that state and 
local police “lack recognized legal authority to stop and detain an 
alien solely on suspicion of civil deportability, as opposed to a crimi-
nal violation of the immigration laws or other laws.”63 
                                                                                                                      
 58. Id. at 474-75; Memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, for the United States Attorney for the Southern District of California, As-
sistance by State and Local Police in Apprehending Illegal Aliens II.B. (Feb. 5, 1996), at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/1996opinions.htm [hereinafter 1996 DOJ Memo on Local Assis-
tance]. 
 59. 722 F.2d at 475-76. 
 60. Id. The Peoria police officers arrested Gonzales and the other plaintiffs for immi-
gration violations. Id. at 472. After determining that federal law did not preempt local en-
forcement of criminal immigration laws, the court found that state law did not authorize 
arrest for the criminal offense of illegal entry unless the arresting officer saw the illegal 
entry occur or had probable cause to believe that it occurred (inability to produce proper 
documentation did not constitute probable cause). Id. at 476-77. For other cases agreeing 
with Gonzales’ distinction between civil and criminal immigration laws, see Farm Labor 
Organizing Committee v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 991 F. Supp. 895, 903 (N.D. Ohio 
1997) (holding that Ohio state highway patrol officers may enforce criminal provisions of 
INA); Gutierrez v. City of Wenatchee, 662 F. Supp. 821, 824 (E.D. Wash. 1987) (holding that 
local police cannot detain individuals who are only suspected of violating civil immigration 
laws); Gates v. Los Angeles Superior Court, 238 Cal. Rptr. 592, 600 (2d Ct. App. 1987) 
(holding that INS has exclusive authority to enforce civil provisions of the INA).  
 61. 1996 DOJ Memo on Local Assistance, supra note 58. 
 62. Before a federal officer may make a warrantless arrest for purposes of civil depor-
tation, the officer must reasonably believe that the alien is in the United States illegally 
and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his or her arrest. 8 U.S.C. § 
1357(a)(2) (2000). 
 63. 1996 DOJ Memo on Local Assistance, supra note 58.  
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 As a matter of judicial interpretation, the accuracy of the Gonzales 
court’s characterization that criminal provisions in the INA are “few 
in number and relatively simple in their terms” is questionable. As 
Yañez and Soto point out, there are at least twenty-five criminal im-
migration offenses defined in the INA, not just the three that the 
Gonzales court focused on.64 Nor are these criminal provisions a “nar-
row and distinct element” of the INA as the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded.65 The criminal provisions are closely interrelated with the 
civil provisions and, together, they provide the total immigration 
regulation scheme. For example, the immigration crime of illegal en-
try is punishable by deportation, a civil measure, or imprisonment, a 
criminal punishment.66 And other immigration crimes are defined by 
reference to civil immigration violations.67  
 As a practical matter, there is substantial potential for overlap be-
tween the civil and criminal immigration provisions. Officers on the 
beat either (1) may have difficulty in distinguishing between prob-
able cause to arrest for a criminal immigration violation and prob-
able cause to arrest for a civil violation68 or (2) may be tempted to 
manufacture criminal probable cause after the fact to assert jurisdic-
tion.69  
 For these reasons, the position that local law officers may enforce 
criminal but not civil immigration laws presents serious problems, 
both in terms of judicial interpretation and practical enforcement. 
G.   Emphasis on State Authority with Limited Preemption Analysis 
 On the issue of local enforcement, the Tenth Circuit took a nar-
rower approach to the preemption analysis, emphasizing state au-
thority. In United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, the issue was the au-
thority of state officers to arrest for immigration violations where the 
                                                                                                                      
 64. Linda Reyna Yañez & Alfonso Soto, Local Police Involvement in the Enforcement 
of Immigration Law, 1 HISP. L.J. 9, 27 (1994). 
 65. Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 475. 
 66. Yañez & Soto, supra note 64, at 29. 
 67. Id.; see, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2000) (making it a 
crime to reenter after deportation—a civil immigration proceeding). 
 68. For example, an officer untrained in immigration law may not be able to distin-
guish between the probable cause needed to arrest a person who has illegally entered (a 
misdemeanor), compared with a person who is illegally present in the United States (a civil 
violation). See Cecilia Renn, State and Local Enforcement of the Criminal Immigration 
Statutes and the Preemption Doctrine, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 999, 1018 (1987). Both persons 
will probably lack proper documentation, appear to be foreign nationals, and may admit to 
being illegally present. Id. The requisite additional evidence needed to arrest for illegal en-
try is highly subjective, including a defendant’s behavior or clothing or the officer’s own 
experience with patterns of immigration violations. Id. at 1018-19. 
 69. Thus, though the Gonzales court held that the arresting officers did not have 
probable cause to arrest Gonzales for illegal entry merely because he was of Mexican origin 
and did not have proper documentation, the additional evidence to justify his arrest could 
have been as subjective as a furtive glance from him. See id. at 1019.  
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arrest was authorized by state law but not federal law.70 Under 
Oklahoma law, local officers have authority to make arrests for fed-
eral offenses, but under the INA, local officers may arrest an alien 
who is illegally present in the United States only if the officers first 
confirm with INS that the alien was previously convicted of a felony 
and deported.71  
 The officers arrested Vasquez-Alvarez for illegal presence without 
any knowledge or confirmation of his previous felony conviction and 
deportation.72 Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit held that his arrest was 
valid.73 Because the arrest was authorized by state law, the court 
held that the officers did not need specific authorization from a fed-
eral statute; furthermore, looking only to the specific language and 
intent of § 1252c (as opposed to the whole structure of the INA con-
sidered by the Ninth Circuit in Gonzales), the Tenth Circuit found 
that the federal provision did not preempt state enforcement action.74 
 Applied more broadly to the issue of local enforcement, the 
Vasquez-Alvarez decision is troubling. As the Tenth Circuit itself 
conceded, its decision made § 1252c meaningless.75 If state law is al-
ways looked to to determine local authority to make immigration ar-
                                                                                                                      
 70. 176 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 71. Section 1252c reads in relevant part:  
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, to the extent permitted by rele-
vant State and local law, State and local law enforcement officials are author-
ized to arrest and detain an individual who (1) is an alien illegally present in 
the United States; and (2) has previously been convicted of a felony in the 
United States and deported or left the United States after such conviction, but 
only after the State or local law enforcement officials obtain appropriate con-
firmation from the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the status of 
such individual and only for such period of time as may be required for the Ser-
vice to take the individual into Federal custody for purposes of deporting or 
removing the alien from the United States.  
8 U.S.C. § 1252c(a) (2000).  
 72. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d at 1295. 
 73. Id. at 1296-97. 
 74. Reading § 1252c(a) line-by-line, the court rejected Vasquez’s argument that the 
federal statute expressly preempted Oklahoma law. Id. at 1297-98. The court also con-
cluded that § 1252c’s legislative history reflected Congressional intent that the federal 
statute provide an additional vehicle for local enforcement, not displace any preexisting 
authority that local officers already had. Id. at 1298-99. The court noted that around the 
same time that Congress enacted § 1252c, Congress also passed provisions to encourage 
federal-state cooperation in the enforcement of immigration laws. For example, 8 U.S.C. § 
1357(g)(10)(B) provides that a “formal agreement is not necessary for state and local offi-
cers ‘to cooperate with the’” INS. Id. at 1300. These provisions, the court concluded, 
“evince[] a clear invitation from Congress for state and local agencies to participate in the 
process of enforcing immigration laws.” Id. In dicta, the Ninth Circuit in Mena v. City of 
Simi Valley reached the opposite conclusion in its interpretation of § 1252c, suggesting 
that local authority to make immigration arrests was limited to that permitted by § 1252c 
and other federal statutes. 332 F.3d 1255, 1266 (9th Cir. 2003). Interestingly enough, the 
Ninth Circuit cited to Vasquez-Alvarez as support for its conclusion. Id. at 1265 n.15. 
 75. “Accordingly, it might be argued that this court’s interpretation of § 1252c leaves 
the provision with no practical effect.” Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d at 1300. 
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rests, then the purpose of federal statutes like § 1252c that specify 
the circumstances for local enforcement becomes questionable. In-
deed, if applied more widely, the Vasquez-Alvarez holding casts doubt 
on the effect of other INA provisions like 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1)-(3) and 
8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) that, respectively, allow local authorities to act as 
INS officers when their state enters into a written agreement with 
the Attorney General or when there is an immigration emergency.76  
 A position on local enforcement like that taken by the Tenth Cir-
cuit is troubling because, though it claims to engage in a preemption 
analysis, it will almost never find federal preemption where state law 
allows for enforcement of federal laws.  
H.   State Authority Trumps 
 The third approach taken by courts on local enforcement is to fo-
cus on the authority of the locality under state law, with little or no 
acknowledgment of the federal preemption debate. United States v. 
                                                                                                                      
 76. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1)-(3) (2000) reads in relevant part:  
(1) [T]he Attorney General may enter into a written agreement with a State, or 
any political subdivision of a State, pursuant to which an officer or employee of 
the State or subdivision, who is determined by the Attorney General to be 
qualified to perform a function of an immigration officer in relation to the in-
vestigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United States (including 
the transportation of such aliens across State lines to detention centers), may 
carry out such function at the expense of the State or political subdivision and 
to the extent consistent with State and local law. 
(2) An agreement under this subsection shall require that an officer or em-
ployee of a State or political subdivision of a State performing a function under 
the agreement shall have knowledge of, and adhere to, Federal law relating to 
the function, and shall contain a written certification that the officers or em-
ployees performing the function under the agreement have received adequate 
training regarding the enforcement of relevant Federal immigration laws.  
(3) In performing a function under this subsection, an officer or employee of a 
State or political subdivision of a State shall be subject to the direction and su-
pervision of the Attorney General.   
This section was added as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Respon-
sibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10) (2000) reads in relevant 
part:  
In the event the Attorney General determines that an actual or imminent mass 
influx of aliens arriving off the coast of the United States, or near a land bor-
der, presents urgent circumstances requiring an immediate Federal response, 
the Attorney General may authorize any State or local law enforcement officer, 
with the consent of the head of the department, agency, or establishment under 
whose jurisdiction the individual is serving, to perform or exercise any of the 
powers, privileges, or duties conferred or imposed by this chapter or regulations 
issued thereunder upon officers or employees of the Service. 
In fifty years, this provision has only been used once. In 1994, DOJ invoked § 1103 to 
deputize Florida law enforcement to cope with the influx of 30,000+ Cuban and Haitian 
refugees who arrived on Florida’s shores. MIGRATION POLICY INST., AUTHORITY OF STATE 
AND LOCAL OFFICERS TO ARREST ALIENS SUSPECTED OF CIVIL INFRACTIONS OF FEDERAL 
IMMIGRATION LAW 6 (June 11, 2002), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/files/authority.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 8, 2004). 
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Salinas-Calderon, previously discussed,77 took this approach. Other 
courts have cited to Salinas-Calderon in upholding local enforcement 
of immigration laws.78 
 The main problem with this approach is that it fails to adequately 
explain the supposed basis for local authority or to explain the ap-
propriate dividing line, if any, between local and federal enforcement 
of immigration laws. May local authorities enforce all immigration 
laws, even civil laws that involve only minor infractions? (Salinas-
Calderon and progeny involved criminal immigration violations, so 
arguably, they are just following the criminal/civil distinction laid out 
in Gonzales.) Where state law allows for local enforcement, may Con-
gress preempt this local enforcement? And if so, what types of evi-
dence would be sufficient under this approach to show federal pre-
emptory intent? 
 Because this third approach looks only to state law without ac-
knowledging any of the issues relevant to the preemption debate, it 
leaves these important questions unanswered. 
I.   Opposition: The Political Quagmire 
 Local enforcement of immigration laws has historically evoked a 
strong reaction from opponents. Those opponents have included not 
only immigrants and advocates for immigrants but also law enforce-
ment officials and community leaders. Austin, Texas, Police Assis-
tant Chief Rudy Landeros said, “[o]ur officers will not, and let me 
stress this because it is very important, our officers will not stop, de-
tain, or arrest anybody solely based on their immigration status. Pe-
riod.”79  
 Why such vehement opposition? Opponents of local enforcement 
point to three interrelated concerns: (1) local police are not trained in 
the intricacies of immigration law and may resort to racial profiling 
of Hispanics and other visible minorities (including permanent resi-
dents and U.S. citizens); (2) immigrant communities will become dis-
trustful of local police, with the result that immigrants will be less 
likely to report crimes or volunteer information to assist criminal in-
vestigations; and (3) valuable police resources will be diverted from 
fighting violent crime, decreasing safety for the entire community.80  
                                                                                                                      
 77. 728 F.2d 1298 (10th Cir. 1984). 
 78. See United States v. Perez-Sosa, 164 F.3d 1082, 1084 (8th Cir. 1998) (upholding 
state trooper’s arrest of defendant for transporting illegal aliens); Gomez v. State, 517 So. 
2d 110, 111 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (upholding state officer’s authority to inquire about defen-
dant’s immigration status after routine traffic stop). 
 79. Austin Police Won’t Arrest People Only for Immigration Status (KEYE CBS Austin 
television broadcast, Apr. 5, 2002), at http://www.immigrationforum.org/currentissues/ 
articles/043002_foi.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2004).  
 80. See infra notes 81-107 and accompanying text. 
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 The first concern, that lack of immigration law training will lead 
to racial profiling by local police, is shared by both advocates for im-
migrants and local authorities alike. It is clearly established law that 
a person cannot be stopped and questioned about her immigration 
status merely because of her race.81 Instead, an immigration officer 
must have reasonable suspicion that the person being stopped is in 
the country illegally.82 In the border area, reasonable suspicion for 
stopping a vehicle may be based on a number of factors: characteris-
tics of the area where the car is traveling (proximity to the border 
and usual patterns of traffic), the driver’s behavior (“erratic driving 
or obvious attempts to evade officers”), the appearance of the person 
or persons being stopped (mode of dress or haircuts characteristic of 
persons living in Mexico), or aspects of the vehicle itself (vehicles 
with large compartments that could be used to transport illegal 
aliens or heavily loaded vehicles).83 “In all situations the officer is en-
titled to assess the facts in light of his experience in detecting illegal 
entry and smuggling.”84  
 Yet local authorities untrained in the nuances of immigration law 
and inexperienced in the detection of illegal immigration may be 
tempted to rely solely on prohibited factors like the person’s race, for-
eign appearance, or use of a foreign language like Spanish.85 Immi-
grant advocacy groups cite racial profiling as one of the consequences 
of local enforcement that they fear most.86 But the concern about ra-
cial profiling is also shared by law enforcement officers who would be 
responsible for implementing local enforcement. Says Eric Nishimoto, 
spokesperson for the Ventura County Sheriff’s Department,  
We’re not in favor of having our department being responsible for 
that function [immigration law enforcement] . . . . The number one 
risk is the potential for civil rights violations. Right now we’re in-
                                                                                                                      
 81. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975) (holding that Border 
Patrol’s stop of a vehicle and questioning of its occupants based only on the occupants’ 
Mexican ancestry violated the Fourth Amendment).  
 82. Id. at 881. Reasonable suspicion is enough for limited, Terry-type stops where the 
immigration officer questions “the driver and passengers about their citizenship and im-
migration status” and asks “them to explain suspicious circumstances.” Id. at 881-82. Any 
further detention or search requires consent or probable cause. Id. at 882. 
 83. Id. at 884-85. 
 84. Id. at 885. 
 85. In its 1997 sweep, police officers of Chandler, Arizona, used these prohibited fac-
tors to determine whom to stop and question about possible immigration violations. See 
CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL GRANT WOODS, SURVEY OF THE 
CHANDLER POLICE DEPARTMENT-INS/BORDER PATROL JOINT OPERATION (1997) (on file 
with the National Immigration Project) [hereinafter CHANDLER REPORT]. The Chandler 
operation is discussed in more detail infra notes 102-07 and accompanying text. 
 86. ACLU Statement on New York City’s Policy Regarding Local law Enforcement 
and Immigration Before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Secu-
rity and Claims (Feb. 27, 2003), http://www.aclu.org/ImmigrantsRights/ImmigrantsRights. 
cfm?ID=11937&c=22 (last visited Feb. 11, 2004). 
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volved in preventing any kind of racial profiling and this type of 
function could open us to that kind of risk. . . . We feel our officers 
are not equipped to make that kind of determination of who is le-
gal.87 
 Even without the specter of racial profiling, immigrants who 
know that their local police department is enforcing immigration 
laws will avoid contacting the police. The result is that immigrants 
will be less likely to provide information that could assist criminal 
investigations and immigrant victims will be less likely to report 
crimes for fear of deportation.88 Even those immigrants with legal 
status may not contact police because they do not want to bring un-
documented friends, family members, or neighbors to the attention of 
the authorities.89 According to police officials across the country, 
growing distrust between their departments and immigrant commu-
nities would be a public safety disaster, affecting both the docu-
mented and undocumented communities.90 
 This problem was dramatically brought to the nation’s attention 
in October 2002 during the tense investigation of the District of Co-
lumbia sniper attacks.91 Several of the sniper attacks occurred in 
suburban areas with large immigrant communities, and immigrants 
emerged as important witnesses to the investigation.92 But after the 
                                                                                                                      
 87. Frank Moraga, Police Balk at Having to Do INS Work; Several Local Agencies De-
nounce Justice Plan, VENTURA COUNTY STAR, Apr. 6, 2002, at B01, LEXIS, News Library, 
VNCST File. 
 88. See Jason Stein, Should Local Police Help the INS; Sauk County Situation Re-
flects a National Situation: Contact with Authorities Often Results in Latinos Being De-
ported, WIS. ST. J., Aug. 4, 2002, at B1, 2002 WL 24280982. ‘“If there’s an accident, we’re 
afraid we’ll be picked up,’ said Raul, who asked that his last name be withheld out of fear 
of being deported, ‘If a man is hitting his wife, we can’t talk about it because we’re fright-
ened.”’  Id. 
 89. “All Latinos, regardless of their citizenship status, are going to be more distrustful 
of police and less likely to report crimes,” says Michele Waslin, a senior immigration policy 
analyst at the National Council of La Raza. For example, she says, a Latino permanent 
resident may not call the police if she is not carrying her green card for fear of being ar-
rested. Mary Jacoby, Safety and Rights in the Balance, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 16, 
2002, at 1A, 2002 WL 100420262.  
 90. Says Hillsboro, Oregon Police Chief Ron Louie, “We’re trying to build bridges with 
people living in fear. . . . If police officers become agents of the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service, . . . their ability to deal with issues such as domestic violence and crime 
prevention will be severely curtailed.” Rosario Daza, Helping People Without Papers, 
PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Apr. 5, 2002, at C01, 2002 WL 3954137. Lieutenant Tomas Padilla 
of the Hackensack, New Jersey, Police Department recounts an example of immigrant as-
sistance: “[T]wo immigrants recently helped us solve a crime. . . . Maybe they were un-
documented, we didn’t ask. But maybe that cooperation would not have occurred if we 
were forced to ask them for their immigration documents. . . . When immigrants fear they 
might be deported, they are not going to report the crime.” Miguel Perez, Ashcroft Comes to 
His Senses, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), June 10, 2002, at L01, 2002 WL 4661090. 
 91. Mary Beth Sheridan & Sylvia Moreno, Police Appeal to Immigrants for Help in 
Search for Sniper, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2002, at A13, 2002 WL 101779119. 
 92. Id. 
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arrest and deportation of two Hispanic men unrelated to the snipers 
(they had the bad luck of driving a white van that police mistakenly 
thought was linked to the snipers and of making phone calls from a 
phone booth that police were monitoring), Hispanic immigrants were 
afraid to come forward.93 Listeners called into Spanish language ra-
dio stations to express their fears about providing information, and 
the Montgomery police department received tips from Spanish-
speaking callers who did not leave any contact information for follow-
up.94 Recognizing the importance of immigrant assistance to the on-
going investigation, both Montgomery Police Chief Charles Moose 
and then INS Commissioner James Ziglar made a special appeal to 
immigrants, promising that INS would not seek any immigration in-
formation that witnesses provided to the local authorities.95 
 Perhaps the most widely shared objection to local enforcement is 
the concern that valuable police resources will be diverted from fight-
ing violent crime. Even police chiefs who favor local enforcement as a 
policy matter are reluctant to give their officers more work and re-
sponsibilities. Rather, in these times of declining local budgets, many 
police chiefs have instructed their officers to focus on preventing and 
investigating the violent crime that most directly affects their com-
munities.96  
 Many police officials regard immigration law enforcement as the 
responsibility of the federal government (both politically and fis-
cally),97 and many officials, particularly those in the border states, 
are skeptical that the federal government is serious about fulfilling 
that responsibility. Local police recount experiences like that of the 
Houston Police Department (HPD): in January 2003, HPD picked up 
eight immigrants presumed to be undocumented (the human cargo of 
a smuggling operation), but released them when INS did not respond 
to HPD’s call.98 INS defended itself as “too short-staffed” to respond 
to every call99 but, to former HPD chief Sam Nuchia, the incident was 
part of a regular pattern of INS behavior, reflecting the federal gov-
                                                                                                                      
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Police Foundation President Hubert Williams questions the relative importance of 
immigration law enforcement. “Where does [local enforcement] fit in the context of priori-
ties? . . . Would it go ahead of robbery, homicide, drug offenses, any of those things?” Karen 
Brandon, U.S. Weighs Local Role on Immigration; Some Police Fear Dual Duty Would Hurt 
Minority Ties, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 14, 2002, at 10, 2002 WL 2644608.  
 97. About local enforcement, Minneapolis Police Chief Robert Olson says, “We are not 
the INS, and we do not want to be the INS. . . . That is a federal issue.” Jackie Crosby, 
Minneapolis Chief, Mayor Vow to Work with City’s Somalis; Police Issues Raised at Com-
munity Forum, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), June 7, 2002, at 03B, 2002 WL 5376311. 
 98. Edward Hegstrom, Mix-up over 8 Immigrants to Be Probed, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 9, 
2003, at 19, 2003 WL 3229308. 
 99. Id. 
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ernment’s ambivalence about enforcing immigration laws.100 In re-
sponse to this ambivalence and to fears that immigrants were at risk 
of being victimized, Nuchia implemented the department’s current 
policy prohibiting officers from arresting people for being in the 
United States illegally.101  
 Critics of local enforcement point to the joint operation of the 
Chandler, Arizona, police department and the INS, in July 1997, as 
an example of all the things that can go wrong with local enforcement 
of immigration laws. The purpose of the joint operation was to rid the 
community of undocumented residents and, during this five day op-
eration, 432 undocumented persons (all Hispanic) were arrested and 
deported.102 Responding to complaints from American citizens and 
permanent residents who were also swept up by the joint operation, 
the Arizona Attorney General found evidence of numerous constitu-
tional and statutory violations.103  
 Specifically, the Attorney General found that citizens and perma-
nent residents were stopped by Chandler police officers multiple 
times (some stops within short distances of each other) “for no other 
apparent reason than their skin color or Mexican appearance or use 
of the Spanish language.”104 Moreover, the city police (often unaccom-
panied by INS/Border Patrol agents) stopped children, checked in 
and around schools, and entered homes and businesses, all to inves-
tigate the citizenship of occupants and all without warrants or par-
ticularized information suggesting criminal activity.105 As a result of 
its local enforcement, the city was slapped with two civil rights law-
suits and had to pay out more than half a million dollars in settle-
ments.106 Perhaps more damaging was the distrust that the local en-
forcement caused with the local immigrant community, creating, in 
the words of the Arizona Attorney General, “an atmosphere of fear 
and uncertainty in the particular targeted zone and beyond.”107 
 Even in the post 9/11 environment, there is still fierce political 
opposition to local enforcement of immigration laws. True, some po-
                                                                                                                      
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See CHANDLER REPORT, supra note 85, at 1. 
 103. Id. at 30, 32. 
 104. Id. at 31. 
 105. Id. at 31-32. 
 106. Hernan Rozemberg, INS Duty for Local Officers Criticized, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 
6, 2002, at 1B. Though his survey focused on the treatment of American citizens and legal 
residents, the Attorney General also raised questions about the mistreatment of undocu-
mented individuals during the joint operation. See CHANDLER REPORT, supra note 85, at 
28. Specifically, the Attorney General noted that undocumented individuals were loaded 
into a van with closed windows and no drinking water or bathroom facilities during the ex-
treme July heat and in at least one instance, INS agents had to restrain Chandler police 
officers from using inappropriate physical force. Id. 
 107. CHANDLER REPORT, supra note 85, at 32.  
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lice departments have taken up Attorney General Ashcroft’s invita-
tion to enforce immigration laws, and Florida has signed a Memo-
randum of Understanding with DOJ, allowing a limited number of its 
officers to perform immigration-related functions.108 But post 9/11, at 
least two states and thirty cities and towns have passed laws direct-
ing their police departments and/or city workers not to enforce immi-
gration laws. Many of these laws were passed at the urging of immi-
grants’ rights groups.109 
 While the specific numbers of local authorities who decide to en-
force or not enforce immigration laws may fluctuate, the issue of local 
enforcement is sure to be stuck in a political quagmire for some time 
to come.  
J.   Inherent Authority: Avoiding the Legal and Political Quagmire 
 By asserting that the local authority to enforce immigration laws 
derives from their status as sovereign entities, DOJ seeks to avoid 
the legal and political problems discussed above. If states and locali-
ties have inherent authority, then they do not have to try to discern 
congressional intent, avoiding the preemption debate altogether. And 
because authority based on sovereign status does not require legisla-
tive or executive action, local authorities can start enforcement im-
mediately and quietly, avoiding the political fallout that might come 
from taking more overt action (like signing a Memorandum of Under-
standing).110  
Another advantage of the DOJ position for local authorities is 
that it leaves the door open for them to enforce all immigration laws, 
both criminal and civil. Attorney General Ashcroft has defined his 
request for local assistance narrowly: to help BTS pick up those per-
                                                                                                                      
 108. See supra Part II.B., notes 19-30 and accompanying text.  
 109. For example, Seattle’s policy that prohibits police and other municipal workers 
from asking about the immigration status of people they encounter was strongly backed by 
the Hate Free Zone Campaign of Washington, the Northwest Immigrants’ Rights Project, 
People’s Coalition for Justice, and Northwest Labor and Employment Law Office. See Seat-
tle Adopts “Don’t Ask” Police Policy on Immigration, supra note 15. 
 110. The National Council of La Raza, the largest civil rights organization representing 
Hispanic Americans, condemned the MOU as another anti-immigration measure “driving 
the undocumented population deeper underground.” Darryl Fears, Hispanic Group Assails 
INS Enforcement Plan; La Raza Says Fla. Pact Stirs Immigrant Fears, WASH. POST, July 
23, 2002, at A3, 2002 WL 23855457. Despite such criticism, Florida Governor Jeb Bush 
clearly felt he had enough electorate support to sign the MOU four months before he was 
up for reelection. And his political gamble paid off, as he was reelected with fifty-six per-
cent of the vote. See Florida Department of State, Division of Elections, Nov. 5, 2002 Gen-
eral Election, Official Results, Governor and Lieutenant Governor, http://election.dos. 
state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/Index.asp?ElectionDate=11/5/02&DATAMODE=. 
Analysts estimate that Jeb Bush won 56-65% of the Hispanic vote. See Ruy Teixeira, 
Where the Democrats Lost, AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 16, 2002, at 1618, 2002 WL 776174; 
Stephen Dinan, Parties Wooed Hispanics with Record Ad Spending; GOP Claims Solid 
Gains from Language Strategy, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2002, at A04, 2002 WL 2922132. 
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sons listed in the National Crime Information Center system as vio-
lating the registration requirements of N-SEERS.111 However, inher-
ent authority based on sovereign status would support local enforce-
ment beyond this narrow mission, everything from picking up un-
documented farm workers to checking the citizenship status of all 
persons that local authorities encounter, not just those listed in the 
NCIC.112  
 For those who favor local enforcement, the inherent authority po-
sition has the advantage of arguably avoiding the complex legal and 
political questions discussed above. But the position runs into a more 
insurmountable barrier: the constitutional requirement that the na-
tion’s immigration laws be enforced uniformly. 
III.   THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE FOR UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT 
 The Constitution requires uniform enforcement in immigration 
laws because the immigration power is an exclusively federal power 
that must be exercised uniformly. This conclusion is compelled by an 
examination of the sources of the immigration power, as well as by 
the power’s inextricable foreign policy implications. Moreover, the 
constitutional mandate for uniformity requires uniform enforcement, 
as well as uniform laws, because in the immigration law context, 
nonuniform enforcement has the same negative effect as nonuniform 
laws and implicates the same foreign policy concerns.113 
A.   The Exclusively Federal Sources of the Immigration Power  
 An analysis of the sources of the immigration power shows that 
the power was intended by the Framers to be exclusively federal and 
to be exercised uniformly. As explained further below, this conclusion 
has also been adopted by courts analyzing the nature of the immigra-
                                                                                                                      
 111. See Ashcroft Remarks for Chiefs of Police, supra note 48. Alberto Gonzales, Coun-
sel to the President, has also emphasized that the local enforcement sought by the federal 
government will be limited to anti-terrorism efforts. “[S]tate and local police have inherent 
authority to arrest and detain persons who are in violation of immigration laws and whose 
names have been placed in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). . . . Only high-
risk aliens who fit a terrorist profile will be placed in NCIC.” Letter from Alberto R. Gonza-
les, Counsel to the President, to Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Migration Policy Institute 
(June 24, 2002) (on file with author).  
 112. Certainly, United States v. Salinas-Calderon, which DOJ purportedly relies on as 
support, does not contain any limiting language. 728 F.2d 1298 (10th Cir. 1984). Oppo-
nents of local enforcement fear that DOJ’s invitation will result in local attempts to enforce 
all immigrations laws. In Temecula, California, for example, a field worker was arrested by 
a deputy sheriff and held for deportation. The sheriff’s office said he was arrested as part of 
a traffic stop, but immigrant advocates believe that he was stopped for no other reason 
than to check the validity of his immigration status. See Vanessa Colon, Groups Watch Ar-
rest Case; Immigration; The Incident Near Temecula Might Shed Light on Enforcement by 
Police, PRESS-ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), May 9, 2003, at B01, 2003 WL 19924180. 
 113. See infra notes 114-62 and accompanying text.  
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tion power. 
 The authority of the federal government to regulate immigration 
is a widely accepted principle.114 But unlike the powers to declare war 
and enter into treaties,115 the immigration power is not expressly 
enumerated in the Constitution. Instead, courts and scholars have 
understood the immigration power as emanating from two sources: 
specific constitutional provisions and the nation’s status as a sover-
eign entity.116 
 Both of these sources as they pertain to the immigration power 
are exclusively federal. The textual sources that have been identified 
at various times by the Supreme Court as giving rise to the immigra-
tion power—the Naturalization Clause, the Foreign Affairs Clauses, 
and the Commerce Clause—were intended to be and have been 
treated by courts as establishing exclusively federal powers.117 For 
example, the Framers drafted the Naturalization Clause because 
they were dissatisfied with the divergent naturalization laws that in-
dividual states implemented under the Articles of Confederation.118 
                                                                                                                      
 114. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 
581, 603 (1889) (“That the government of the United States, through the action of the legis-
lative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not 
think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident 
of every independent nation.”). Chae Chan Ping is discussed infra notes 122-24 and accom-
panying text.  
 115. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 116. See Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration 
Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 532-52 (2001).  
 117. Id. at 533-49. The Naturalization Clause authorizes Congress “[t]o establish an 
uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . throughout the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 4. The Foreign Affairs Clauses include the Congressional powers to declare war, id. art. 
I, § 8, cl. 11, the Senate power to advise and consent to the appointment of ambassadors, 
id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and the Presidential power to make treaties, with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate, id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The Commerce Clause empowers Congress “[t]o 
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the In-
dian tribes.” Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION 
AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 177-82 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing possible delegated 
sources of the immigration power).  
 118. Wishnie, supra note 116, at 534-35. Some courts and scholars have interpreted 
the Naturalization Clause more broadly as the source of the general immigration power, 
rather than just naturalization standards. See, e.g., Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Congressional 
Arrogation of Power: Alien Constellation in the Galaxy of Equal Protection, 74 B.U. L. REV. 
591, 631 (1994) (arguing that federal legislation authorizing states to discriminate against 
immigrants in distributing state welfare benefits conflicts with the Naturalization Clause’s 
mandate for uniform immigration policy); see also Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085 
(N.Y. 2001) (striking down state law that terminated state-funded Medicaid benefits for 
certain classes of noncitizens because it created nonuniform immigration policy, federal 
authorization notwithstanding), discussed in more detail, infra notes 183-89 and accompa-
nying text. 
 The same provision that grants Congress the authority to establish a “uniform Rule of 
Naturalization” also gives it authority to establish “uniform Laws on the subject of Bank-
ruptcies.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. One may wonder whether the tolerance of nonuni-
form state bankruptcy laws means that we should similarly tolerate state involvement in 
immigration law. But the Naturalization Clause differs from the Bankruptcy Clause in 
2004]                          INHERENT FLAWS 989 
 
And in implementing the Naturalization Clause, the majority of 
courts that have considered the issue developed a federal common 
law of what it means for a naturalization applicant to be of “good 
moral character,” rather than incorporate divergent state laws on 
adultery and sodomy.119  
                                                                                                                      
several important respects: the Naturalization Clause calls for the establishment of a sin-
gular “Rule” while the Bankruptcy Clause uses the plural “Laws,” suggesting that the uni-
formity requirement in these clauses is different, and courts have interpreted the federal 
bankruptcy power to be concurrent with states’ authority in this area. See, e.g., Kosto v. 
Lausch, 16 B.R. 162, 164-65 (M.D. Fla. 1981) (upholding federal law that allowed states to 
determine bankruptcy exemptions because states have concurrent legislative authority in 
this area); Wishnie, supra note 116, at 536-37. 
 119. Wishnie, supra note 116, at 535 n.22 (citing to Soloranzo-Patlan v. Immigration 
and Naturalization Serv., 207 F.3d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 2000) (because of need for uniformity 
in immigration law, courts must develop federal common law definition of “burglary,” 
rather than incorporate different state law definitions)); see also Nemetz v. Immigration 
and Naturalization Serv., 647 F.2d 432, 435 (4th Cir. 1981) (The court rejected Virginia 
sodomy law as a basis for concluding that applicant for citizenship committed crime of 
moral turpitude and thus lacked necessary good moral character: “Development of a fed-
eral standard for making that determination provides the only certain means of creating 
the constitutionally required uniform rule; reference to laws which vary from state to state 
can only lead to differing and often inconsistent results.”). But see Brea-Garcia v. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Serv., 531 F.2d 693, 698 (3d. Cir. 1976) (adopting state law defini-
tion of adultery in denying applicant’s request for voluntary departure in lieu of deporta-
tion). 
 Professor Howard Chang reaches the opposite conclusion: that immigration law often in-
corporates divergent state laws. Howard F. Chang, Public Benefits and Federal Authoriza-
tion for Alienage Discrimination by the States, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 357, 360 
(2002). For example, he argues that noncitizens are often treated differently under federal 
immigration laws depending upon the state in which they got married (because state laws 
determine whether a marriage is valid for the purpose of obtaining an immigration visa) or 
committed a crime (because state laws determine whether a criminal act constitutes a 
crime of moral turpitude and thus could be the basis for inadmissibility or deportation). Id.  
 Several responses are possible. On the issue of marriage laws, these laws actually vary 
very little in substance from state to state, so that incorporating state definitions of mar-
riage does not violate the federal mandate for uniform immigration laws. For example, 
while New York requires parties to a marriage to be at least eighteen, see N.Y. DOM. REL. § 
7 (1999), and Arkansas has a lower minimum age requirement (seventeen for males and 
sixteen for females), see ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-102 (1987), this difference is not as signifi-
cant as it may appear. Under New York law, nonage does not per se void a marriage but is 
only one among many factors to be considered by the courts. See N.Y. DOM. REL. § 7 (1999). 
 As to the argument that state statutory definitions are the sole basis for determining 
whether a crime involves moral turpitude, at least some of the case law suggests other-
wise. Some courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals have looked beyond state defini-
tions to determine what moral turpitude means for immigration law purposes. See, e.g., 
Goldeshtein v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 8 F.3d 645, 648 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(“Even if intent to defraud is not explicit in the statutory definition, a crime nevertheless 
may involve moral turpitude if such intent is implicit in the nature of the crime.”) (internal 
quotations omitted); In re Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 225, 226 (B.I.A. 1980) (holding that 
though federal statute prohibiting the counterfeiting of immigration documents does not 
require a showing of intent to defraud, such intent is inherent in the act of counterfeiting 
so that violating the statute constitutes a crime of moral turpitude). Even those courts that 
have limited their analysis of moral turpitude to the language of state statutes have fo-
cused on the “inherent nature” of the crime, as defined by the state statutes. See, e.g., 
Nguyen v. Reno, 211 F.3d 692, 695 (1st Cir. 2000) (“The focus of the moral turpitude 
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 The U.S.’s status as a sovereign nation—also identified by the 
Supreme Court as a source of the immigration power—further sup-
ports the proposition that the immigration power is exclusively fed-
eral.120 Because it is a sovereign nation, the United States must nec-
essarily have the exclusive power to control entry and exit from its 
borders; otherwise, it would be subject to the control of other na-
tions.121 
 The Supreme Court first articulated this theory in the infamous 
Chinese Exclusion Case, upholding an 1888 federal law that prohib-
ited Chinese laborers from entering the United States (even in those 
cases where the laborers had left the United States with official gov-
ernment permission to return).122 The Court characterized the federal 
government’s ability to exclude foreigners as “an incident of sover-
eignty” and “part of those sovereign powers delegated by the Consti-
tution.”123 The Court compared the immigration power to the power 
to declare war and make treaties, and reasoned that because they all 
affect foreign policy, the powers belong exclusively to the federal gov-
ernment and are “incapable of transfer to any other parties.”124 The 
Court reiterated this theory in subsequent immigration cases as 
well.125  
                                                                                                                      
analysis is on the inherent nature of the crime of conviction, as opposed to the particular 
circumstances of the actual crime committed.”). 
 120. See Wishnie, supra note 116, at 549-52.  
 121. Though it reaches the opposite legal conclusion, the Department of Justice also 
recognizes the link between sovereignty and immigration policy. In its opinion, the Office 
of Legal Counsel reportedly cites to the status of states and local authorities as “sovereign 
entities” to authorize their enforcement of federal immigration laws. See Marcus Stern & 
Mark Arner, Police May Gain Power to Enforce Immigration Plan Has Local Officers, 
Rights Groups on Edge, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 3, 2002, at A1, 2002 WL 4594382. 
But states and local authorities cannot, of course, control entry and exit from their borders, 
except for narrow instances of criminal law enforcement (e.g., setting up road blocks to 
catch criminal fugitives). Rather, they must cede this authority to the federal government. 
See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 85 (1976) (“[W]hereas the Constitution inhibits every 
State’s power to restrict travel across its own borders, Congress is explicitly empowered to 
exercise that type of control over travel across the borders of the United States.”). 
 122. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 
(1889). 
 123. Id. at 609.  
 124. Id.  
 125. See Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (“It is an accepted maxim of 
international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, 
and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions. 
. . . In the United States this power is vested in the national government.”); see also Fong 
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (upholding a federal law that required 
Chinese laborers to produce a white witness to attest to their lawful residence or face ar-
rest and deportation because the right to expel or deport foreigners is an “essential attrib-
ute[ ] of sovereignty”) (citations omitted); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 
U.S. 206, 210 (1953) (“Courts have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as 
a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments 
largely immune from judicial control.”); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 
U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (“The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty. The 
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 Even apart from its foreign policy implications,126 the conclusion 
that the immigration power is a sovereign one suggests that it can 
only be exercised by the sovereign; otherwise, the sovereign’s transfer 
of that power would be tantamount to a surrender of its sover-
eignty.127  
 Though the immigration power cannot be traced definitively to 
any one source, the sources that have been cited establish that the 
power is an exclusively federal one. 
B.   Foreign Policy and the Requirement of Uniformity 
 Inextricably linked to the proposition that the immigration power 
is exclusively federal is its link to foreign policy.128 Because immigra-
tion policy affects our relations with other nations, it must, like other 
aspects of foreign policy, be exercised uniformly and exclusively by 
the federal government.129 
                                                                                                                      
right to do so stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the executive power 
to control the foreign affairs of the nation.”) (citing to United States v. Curtiss-Wright Ex-
port Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)). 
 126. See infra notes 128-49 and accompanying text. 
 127. Wishnie, supra note 116, at 552. Professor William Cohen argues for the opposite 
conclusion: if the federal government may constitutionally adopt a policy, he believes that 
it should be able to consent to states’ adoption of the same policy, even if that policy would 
otherwise be constitutionally prohibited. William Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate 
Unconstitutional State Laws: A Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REV. 387 
(1983). In the context of immigration law, he posits that the federal government could give 
its constitutional blessing to state laws preferring U.S. citizens over noncitizens, because 
the federal government has the authority to adopt these laws directly. Id. at 419-21.  
 Cohen’s proposition is problematic for several reasons. Though he acknowledges that the 
consent principle may be problematic against a constitutional requirement of national uni-
formity, id. at 404-05, he does not consider the legal and historical support for a uniform 
immigration system or the possible chaos that would result from differing state immigra-
tion policies. These consequences present both doctrinal and policy reasons to restrict state 
action in the immigration field, even with federal endorsement. See generally Wishnie, su-
pra note 116, at 565-66 (also arguing that the consent principle ignores the equal protec-
tion analysis in Supreme Court cases like Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), that 
made state immigration laws subject to strict scrutiny). 
 128. Cf. Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
339, 340-41 (2002) (arguing that a relatively stable international system has lessened the 
foreign policy impact of immigration law and consequently decreased the need for judicial 
deference to federal immigration policy). 
 129. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (holding that a 
Massachusetts law restricting the ability of state agencies to buy goods or services from 
companies that did business with Burma violated the Supremacy Clause because it inter-
fered with the President’s ability to forge foreign policy); Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 123 
S. Ct. 2374, 2386 (2003) (holding that the California Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief 
Act, which was designed to force defaulting insurers to pay on insurance policies issued to 
Jews before and during World War II, unconstitutionally interfered with President’s for-
eign policy power to settle claims with other countries; state law affecting foreign policy 
“must yield to the National Government’s policy, given the concern for uniformity in this 
country’s dealings with foreign nations that animated the Constitution’s allocation of the 
foreign relations power to the National Government in the first place”) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
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 The same Supreme Court cases that held the immigration power 
to be vested exclusively in the federal government did so, at least in 
part, because of immigration’s effect on the nation’s foreign policy. In 
upholding an 1891 federal statute that entrusted final factfinding au-
thority to immigration inspectors (allowing inspectors to exclude im-
migrants from the United States without opportunity for judicial re-
view), the Supreme Court in Ekiu v. United States reasoned that the 
immigration power was part and parcel of the federal government’s 
authority over foreign affairs generally: “In the United States this 
[immigration] power is vested in the national government, to which 
the Constitution has committed the entire control of international re-
lations, in peace as well as in war.”130  
 Just what effect do immigration laws have on the nation’s foreign 
policy? History shows that the U.S.’s immigration laws, specifically 
those that determine which foreign nationals to admit or expel and 
under what circumstances, have affected its relations with the home 
countries of those nationals. And the reverse is also true—that immi-
gration laws have been used as instruments to achieve the nation’s 
foreign policy objectives.  
 Of the first proposition, perhaps the best example is the United 
States’ relationship with Mexico. One credible estimate, based on the 
2000 census data, is that there are 4.5 million undocumented Mexi-
can nationals present in the United States.131 United States immigra-
tion policies toward these undocumented migrants has spilled over to 
affect its political relations with Mexico.  
 An example from recent events: shortly after their elections, U.S. 
President George W. Bush and Mexican President Vicente Fox 
started serious discussions about the possibility of a historic bilateral 
agreement on migration. Fox lobbied for greater labor migration and 
the opportunity for many undocumented Mexican workers already in 
the United States to gain legal status;132 for its part, the Bush ad-
ministration wanted a revised guest worker program. The agreement 
ran into problems even before the events of 9/11,133 but the terrorist 
attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. dealt a terrible blow, as 
U.S. policy shifted to restricting immigration, not expanding it.134  
                                                                                                                      
 130. Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892).  
 131. Eduardo Porter, Illegal Immigrants May Total 8.5 Million, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 
2001, at A4, 2001 WL 2872500. 
 132. Ginger Thompson, U.S. and Mexico to Open Talks on Freer Migration for Workers, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2001, at A1, LEXIS, News Library, NYT File. 
 133. Eric Schmitt and Ginger Thompson, Mexico Takes Small Steps to Improving Its 
U.S. Ties, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2001, at A6, LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.  
 134. Ronald Brownstein, Green Light, Red Light: Is the Push to Liberalize Immigration 
Policy a Casualty of the Surprise Terrorist Attacks on September 11?, AM. PROSPECT, Nov. 
19, 2001, at 2831, 2001 WL 7681289; Julia Malone, Immigration Takes Back Seat to Secu-
rity; Strong Pact with Mexico Uncertain, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 20, 2002, at 3A, LEXIS, 
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 Failure to obtain a favorable migration agreement from the 
United States hurt Fox’s political popularity at home, which in turn 
had political consequences for the United States. Fox made a migra-
tion accord one of his top priorities,135 and his failure to obtain the ac-
cord deepened voters’ disappointment with him and his National Ac-
tion Party (PAN).136 In an attempt to shore up his standing with 
Mexican voters who overwhelmingly opposed the war in Iraq, Fox 
cast Mexico’s vote as a member of the U.N. Security Council against 
military action and in support of France’s request for diplomatic solu-
tions.137 Consequently, United States-Mexico relations have grown 
noticeably colder.138  
 Of the second proposition, immigration laws used to achieve 
United States foreign policy objectives, numerous examples exist. 
Under the Refugee Act of 1980, the system of refugee admissions is 
structured to reflect U.S. foreign policy priorities. The President, in 
consultation with Congress, decides how many refugees will be ad-
mitted each year and, significantly, how the admissions of refugees 
from various countries and regions are allocated.139 So from 1980 un-
til the collapse of communism, Presidents allocated almost all of the 
refugee admissions to people fleeing communist countries like Viet-
nam or other United States adversaries like Iran.140  
                                                                                                                      
News Library, ATLJNL File. There has been some subsequent Congressional movement 
toward guest worker/legalization legislation. See Bruce Alpert, Bill Would Legalize Foreign 
Workers’ Status; Immigrants Would Get Unwanted Jobs, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 6, 2003, at 
01, 2003 WL 60057592. 
 135. Fox’s former foreign minister, Jorge Castaneda, said that on migration issues, 
Mexico wanted the “whole enchilada.” Gary Martin, Voters Could Pan Fox’s Party; Border 
Issues, Slump Likely to Cost Mexican President at the Polls, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, 
July 4, 2003, at A1, 2003 WL 58414606. Castaneda resigned in January 2003 out of frus-
tration at the lack of progress with the United States on migration issues. Mexico Says 
U.S. Immigration Deal May Take 30 Years, REUTERS ENGLISH NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 7, 
2003, 11:49:00, WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database. 
 136. Martin, supra note 135. 
 137. Gary Martin, Mexican Official Touts U.S. Relations; Foreign Minister Downplays 
White House Snub of Cinco de Mayo, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, May 8, 2003, at A1, 
2003 WL 20247272. Despite this foreign policy stance, Fox’s PAN Party received only 
30.5% of the vote in the 2003 midterm elections; its rival Institutional Revolutionary Party 
won 34% of the popular vote and four of six state governorships. Mexican Press Review, 
GUARDIAN (London), July 9, 2003, at 24, 2003 WL 56694539. 
 138. In 2003, the White House cancelled its traditional Cinco de Mayo celebration, the 
Mexican holiday that celebrates the Mexican military victory over French forces at the 
Battle of Puebla in 1862, citing scheduling conflicts. Also, the half-page statement that the 
White House issued commemorating the holiday did not mention Fox. Martin, supra note 
137. 
 139. Admissions “shall be allocated among refugees of special humanitarian concern to 
the United States.” Immigration and Nationality Act § 207(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(3) 
(2000). 
 140. See, e.g., Presidential Determination No. 91-3 of Oct. 12, 1990, 55 Fed. Reg. 
41,979-80 (Oct. 17, 1990) (authorization for refugee admissions in 1991 as representative of 
foreign policy pattern). 
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 More recently in January 1990, one month after Chinese govern-
ment troops fired on prodemocracy demonstrators in Tiananmen 
Square, the Attorney General issued interim regulations that auto-
matically made any person who has a well-founded fear of coerced 
abortion or sterilization eligible for political asylum.141 Congress then 
amended the statutory definition of “refugee” to specify that any 
forced abortion or sterilization, or persecution for refusing to submit 
to a forced abortion or sterilization, constituted persecution on ac-
count of political opinion.142 
 Because of its effect on foreign policy, the immigration power 
must be exercised uniformly and exclusively by the federal govern-
ment. Concerns about uniform foreign policy have been the rationale 
for striking down state laws that attempted to regulate immigration, 
while upholding similar federal laws. For example, in Graham v. 
Richardson, the Supreme Court ruled that state laws denying wel-
fare benefits to resident aliens or to resident aliens who have not re-
sided in the United States for a specified number of years violated 
the Equal Protection Clause and encroached on the federal govern-
ment’s exclusive immigration power.143 If states were allowed to dis-
criminate on the basis of alienage, individual states would be able, in 
effect, to deny aliens the full rights of entry and abode, as indigent 
aliens would only be able to settle in hospitable states, in contraven-
tion of federal law.144  
 By contrast, in Mathews v. Diaz, the Supreme Court upheld a 
similar federal law that limited Medicare eligibility to permanent 
resident aliens who had continuously resided in the United States for 
five years or more.145 The Court linked the federal government’s im-
migration power to its foreign policy powers and expressed reluctance 
to subject the federal government to similar constitutional restric-
tions in this realm.146 In distinguishing this case from Graham, the 
Court noted that states have no similar foreign policy interests justi-
fying discrimination based on alienage.147 
 In fact, state attempts to regulate immigration may actually im-
pair federal interests by creating nonuniform foreign policy. In Gra-
ham, the contested state laws appeared, at first blush, only to have 
domestic ramifications (that is, restrictions on the internal movement 
of resident aliens). But as the Court noted in striking down the laws, 
                                                                                                                      
 141. See, e.g., Refugee Status, Withholding of Deportation, and Asylum; Burden of 
Proof, 55 Fed. Reg. 2803-05 (Jan. 29, 1990) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 208, 242). 
 142. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(4) (2000).  
 143. 403 U.S 365, 376-77 (1971). 
 144. Id. at 379-80. 
 145. 426 U.S. 67, 87 (1976). 
 146. Id. at 81. 
 147. Id. at 84-85.  
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those restrictions impact foreign policy in ways that the federal gov-
ernment, in its balancing of international objectives, decided not to 
make.148 Though it would be the individual states making immigra-
tion policy, it would be the federal government that would have to re-
spond if this policy offends a country whose citizens are subject to 
these internal restrictions.149 
 Because of its effect on foreign policy, the immigration power 
must be exercised exclusively and uniformly by the federal govern-
ment. 
C.   Unconstitutionality of Nonuniform Enforcement 
 Nonuniform enforcement of immigration laws poses the same 
constitutional problems as would nonuniform immigration laws. As 
explained further in Part IV, DOJ’s invitation for local enforcement 
will result in a “thousand borders” problem, violating the constitu-
tional mandate for uniform immigration laws as local authorities will 
enforce federal immigration laws differently, creating, in effect, dif-
ferent immigration laws.150  
 Moreover, nonuniform enforcement also implicates foreign policy 
concerns. The thousand borders problem, coupled with the real possi-
bility of rogue local enforcement, will exacerbate uncertainty as to 
how a country’s nationals will be treated within the United States, 
which will, in turn, affect that country’s relations with the United 
States.151 
D.   Nonuniform Enforcement as Setting Policy 
 Local enforcement of federal immigration laws suffers from the 
same constitutional flaws as local immigration legislation would. As 
explained in Part IV, patchwork enforcement by local authorities will 
result in a thousand borders, as the local authorities decide, as an 
                                                                                                                      
 148. Graham, 403 U.S. at 379-80. 
 149. The Supreme Court raised this objection in striking down a California law that 
demanded payment from foreign passengers as a condition for allowing them to land. Chy 
Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279-80 (1875). Though the plaintiff in this case was a Chi-
nese citizen, the Court considered the possibility of British citizens being subjected to this 
demand for payment.  
[C]an any one doubt that this matter would have been the subject of interna-
tional inquiry, if not of a direct claim for redress? Upon whom would such a 
claim be made? Not upon the State of California; for, by our Constitution, she 
can hold no exterior relations with other nations. It would be made upon the 
government of the United States.  
Id. at 279; cf. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (holding California statute that pro-
hibited employers from knowingly employing undocumented workers was not preempted 
by federal immigration law because the statute regulated employment of illegal workers).  
 150. See infra notes 163-89 and accompanying text. 
 151. See infra note 162 and accompanying text. 
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initial matter, whether to enforce immigration laws and then 
whether to enforce all immigration laws or only some subset (like 
criminal immigration laws).152 
 Though local authorities would, in theory, enforce the same fed-
eral immigration laws, differences in their state laws will often result 
in their enforcing, in reality, different immigration laws. For exam-
ple, because California law only allows a warrantless arrest for a 
misdemeanor if the misdemeanor occurs in the arresting officer’s 
presence, a California law officer is unlikely to be able to arrest for il-
legal entry unless he or she sees the actual illegal crossing.153 How-
ever, the federal statute defining illegal entry does not require that 
the arresting officer witness the illegal crossing,154 and federal immi-
gration officials are not subject to such a requirement.155 Thus, be-
cause of differing state laws affecting their enforcement ability, local 
authorities may in effect be enforcing different immigration laws. 
 Moreover, given the realities of limited federal resources for im-
migration law enforcement (particularly in interior areas of the coun-
try),156 a decision by local authorities to enforce immigration laws 
may have the effect of setting immigration policy because the local 
enforcement may constitute the only enforcement of these laws in 
their particular jurisdictions. Thus a decision by local authorities in a 
particular state to enforce immigration laws may actually create im-
migration policy in their state because of the dearth of federal re-
sources to enforce immigration laws.  
 The unconstitutionality of nonuniform local enforcement does not 
mean, however, that current federal enforcement, which may vary 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, is also unconstitutional. Differing 
enforcement of immigration laws at the federal level is constitutional 
because it reflects a unitary federal policy about how many resources 
to devote to immigration enforcement, where to concentrate enforce-
                                                                                                                      
 152. See infra notes 163-67 and accompanying text. 
 153. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 836(a)(1) (West 2003). 
 154. 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2000). 
 155. A federal immigration officer may make a warrantless arrest if the officer has 
“reason to believe” that the arrested person has violated immigration laws and is likely to 
escape before a warrant can be obtained. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (2000). 
 156. There are currently only 2000 federal immigration officials available to enforce in-
terior immigration laws. See JOHN L. MARTIN ET AL., FED’N FOR AM. IMMIGRATION REFORM, 
State of Insecurity: How State and Local Immigration Policies Are Undermining Homeland 
Security, 2, available at http://www.fairus.org/news/NewsPrint.cfm? ID=1626&c=55 (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2004); see also Thomas Ginsberg & Maria Panaritis, U.S. Agents Limit 
Scrutiny of Illegal-Immigrant Arrests; Local Cases Are Ignored if the Person Is Not from a 
“High Risk” Country or a Known Criminal, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 9, 2003, at A01 (noting 
that there are only fourteen federal immigration agents for a 5800 square mile area of of 
southeastern Pennsylvania and South Jersey).  
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ment, and even when to refrain from enforcement.157 Local enforce-
ment, even at the invitation of the federal government, could never 
be similarly unitary. It was this concern for unitary immigration pol-
icy that caused the Supreme Court to strike down the state welfare 
law in Graham v. Richardson, while upholding a similar federal law 
in Mathews v. Diaz.158 
 In addition, the possibility of rogue enforcement of immigration 
laws, where officers employ racial profiling and other prohibited 
practices, is much more likely to occur at the local levels, compound-
ing the uniformity problem. Consider that under DOJ’s invitation, 
there is no provision, or more importantly, funding, to train local au-
thorities in the complexities of immigration law. Compare that to the 
1-5½ months of training that federal immigration officers receive, in-
cluding courses in immigration and nationality law, statutory arrest 
authority, constitutional law, and behavioral sciences.159 This lack of 
training, coupled with lack of hands-on enforcement experience, may 
tempt local authorities to rely on racial profiling and other prohibited 
practices in enforcing immigration laws.160  
 And to the extent that there exists anti-immigrant sentiments 
within a community (perhaps as a result of perceived economic com-
petition with immigrants for scarce jobs), these sentiments may more 
likely be expressed by local authorities who live within those com-
munities, rather than outside federal authorities.161 These factors—
lack of training, lack of experience, and local anti-immigrant senti-
                                                                                                                      
 157. The federal government, for foreign policy reasons, occasionally declines to enforce 
its immigration laws. For example, there appears to be a “gentleman’s agreement” not to 
enforce immigration laws in areas immediately surrounding Mexican consulates. When 
this agreement was breached by the August 2003 arrest of a Mexican family as the family 
was walking to a Mexican consulate in San Diego, Mexico protested strenuously to the Bu-
reau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP, the Border Patrol’s parent agency). BCBP 
agreed to investigate and to stop all such enforcement. See Leonel Sanchez, Mexican Con-
sulate Line Shorter After Family’s Arrest, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug 5, 2003, at B3, 
2003 WL 6600198. 
 158. See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text. 
 159. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
WORKING FOR IMMIGRATION PROGRAMS, CORE OCCUPATIONS, http://uscis.gov/graphics/ 
workfor/careers/core.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2004). 
 160. For example, because they lack experience to recognize signs of illegal immigra-
tion or smuggling, local authorities may be tempted to question people about their immi-
gration status solely based on the person’s Mexican ancestry or use of Spanish, practices 
clearly prohibited by the Constitution. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 
885-86 (1975) (holding that occupants’ apparent Mexican ancestry did not provide reason-
able grounds for immigration officers to stop their vehicle and inquire about their citizen-
ship status); see also supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text. 
 161. In arguing for devolution of immigration powers to the local level, Peter Spiro 
suggests that localized expressions of anti-immigrant sentiments (e.g., state laws that re-
strict immigrant eligibility for public aid) actually benefit immigrants because this local 
expression acts as a safety valve for local frustrations and prevents anti-immigrant senti-
ments from being expressed at the national level. Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with 
Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1628-39 (1997).  
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ments—make rogue enforcement of immigration laws more likely at 
the local level, raising further uniformity concerns about local en-
forcement. Faced with the potential for heightened and multiple lev-
els of rogue enforcement, the federal government would be hard 
pressed to maintain a unitary immigration policy. 
E.   Foreign Policy Implications of Nonuniform Enforcement 
 If, as argued above, local authorities make immigration policy 
when they enforce immigration laws, then other countries may 
rightly feel more uncertainty about how their nationals will be 
treated under that policy than they would under a unitary federal 
policy. This heightened uncertainty could have spillover effects on 
U.S. relations with these countries. And if each state or local author-
ity can enforce immigration laws as a sovereign, then a country that 
disagrees with the treatment of its nationals in a particular instance 
may not have a consistent or effective way to protest that treat-
ment.162  
 Because nonuniform enforcement affects immigration policy and 
foreign policy, it is as constitutionally problematic as nonuniform 
immigration laws. 
IV.   VIOLATING THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE FOR UNIFORMITY 
 The Department of Justice’s inherent authority proposal violates 
the constitutional mandate for uniform immigration laws because it 
results in the nonuniform enforcement of these laws. The nonuniform 
enforcement is an inevitable result of the proposed structure: in the 
first place, states and localities decide whether they want to enforce 
immigration laws, and in the second place, if they do choose to en-
force, they are bound by different state laws that affect their en-
forcement authority. The result would be that an immigration viola-
tion would be prosecuted in one jurisdiction but ignored in the 
neighboring jurisdiction. 
A.   Nonuniformity: The Invitation for Enforcement 
 Because the Department of Justice has structured its proposal as 
an invitation, individual state and localities decide for themselves 
whether to enforce federal immigration laws. Attorney General 
Ashcroft has emphasized repeatedly that local participation in immi-
                                                                                                                      
 162. Consider BCBP’s decision not to enforce immigration laws around Mexican consu-
lates, as discussed in note 157, after Mexico lodged protests with the United States gov-
ernment. If the offending enforcement had instead been carried out by local or state police, 
the ability of Mexico to get that enforcement stopped in a timely manner would have been 
questionable, as Mexico would have had to deal with another level of governmental author-
ity. 
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gration law enforcement is voluntary.163 As a result, local authorities 
choose whether to enforce immigration laws, and the responses have 
been drastically different. 
 Generally, big cities with large immigrant communities have op-
posed local enforcement of immigration laws. Some, like Houston, 
had policies against local enforcement before the events of 9/11, and 
others, like Seattle, passed their policies in response to 9/11 and the 
subsequent clamor for tougher immigration law enforcement.164  
 But in smaller cities and towns and in rural areas, more local au-
thorities have accepted DOJ’s invitation and started to enforce immi-
gration laws.165 For example, in Bryan, Texas, just 100 miles north-
west of Houston, the local police and sheriff’s department engage in 
immigration law enforcement, through racial profiling of Hispanics 
and close cooperation with federal immigration officials.166  
 So if a person with an expired visa were to be stopped in Houston 
for a traffic violation, she would not be asked about her immigration 
status and would only be cited for the traffic offense. However, if she 
had committed the same traffic violation in Bryan, she would have 
her immigration status checked and would likely be placed in depor-
tation proceedings.167 
 This differing enforcement, even between neighboring cities in 
the same state, violates the constitutional mandate for uniform im-
migration laws. 
B.   Nonuniformity: Differing State Laws 
 Even if all the local authorities within a state agreed to enforce 
federal immigration laws, their enforcement would likely be different 
from the enforcement implemented by local authorities in neighbor-
ing states. The enforcement authority of local and state police comes 
from state laws and those laws vary widely as to whether they allow 
local enforcement and, if so, under what conditions. The variation in 
                                                                                                                      
 163. See Ashcroft Remarks on N-SEERS, supra note 2. As discussed supra Part II, 
notes 48-56 and accompanying text, the Tenth Amendment requires that DOJ’s proposal 
be structured as an invitation.  
 164. See Nuchia Order, supra note 12; Seattle Adopts “Don’t Ask” Police Policy on Im-
migration, supra note 15. 
 165. As discussed supra Part II, notes 88-95, 102-07 and accompanying text, police are 
reluctant to enforce immigration laws for fear of sowing distrust between their depart-
ments and local immigrants. For police who work in cities with large immigrant communi-
ties, this distrust would drastically reduce their ability to effectively enforce criminal laws. 
 166. Edward Hegstrom, Family Looking for Justice After Deadly INS Raid, HOUS. 
CHRON., July 28, 2002, at 1, 2002 WL 23211929. 
 167. Says Steve Gongora, a Bryan businessman and member of the Hispanic Group (a 
local group of Latino leaders), “In cases of Hispanics or people who look like they could be 
from Mexico, (police) will ask where they were born, and then they will ask for proper 
documentation.” Hispanics who cannot show proper identification are jailed and federal 
immigration authorities are called. Id. 
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local laws adds another layer of nonuniformity that makes the invita-
tion to local enforcement unconstitutional. 
 The authority of local and state police to make arrests is deter-
mined by state law.168 Thus, any analysis of local enforcement must 
look to the laws of individual states to determine whether and, if so, 
under what circumstances, state law authorizes the types of arrests 
that local enforcement requires.169 For example, Arizona law allows 
officers to make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor if they have 
probable cause to believe that the misdemeanor occurred, regardless 
of whether the offense occurred in their presence.170 But in neighbor-
ing California, by contrast, officers may only make a warrantless ar-
rest for a misdemeanor if the misdemeanor is actually committed in 
their presence.171 
 The result is uneven enforcement of immigration laws, even as 
between neighboring states. Arizona officers would be able to arrest 
for the misdemeanor of illegal entry even if they had not seen the 
person cross the border, as long as they had probable cause to suspect 
that the person had entered the United States illegally.172 In Califor-
nia, however, officers are unlikely to arrest for illegal entry unless 
they happen to be assigned to a border area and to have seen the ac-
tual illegal crossing.173 So, though the offense of illegal entry is de-
fined by one federal law,174 in practice, it will be enforced as different 
laws by local authorities.  
 This different enforcement by local authorities between states 
will necessarily violate the constitutional mandate for uniform immi-
gration laws. 
C.   The “Thousand Borders” Problem 
 The sum result of this nonuniformity—created by the invitational 
structure of DOJ’s proposal and different state laws—would be a 
“thousand borders.” As the examples discussed above demonstrate, 
an immigration violation would be subject to prosecution in one ju-
                                                                                                                      
 168. See Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 475-76 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled in 
part on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999).  
 169. The Ninth Circuit in Gonzales determined that the Arizona law in effect at the 
time allowed officers to arrest for misdemeanors not committed in their presence, as long 
as they have probable cause to believe that the arrestee committed the offense. Id. at 476. 
For the misdemeanor of illegal entry, officers must have more evidence than that the non-
citizen lacked proper paperwork, as there are other reasons not related to illegal entry to 
explain why he or she may not have proper papers (expired visa, etc.). Id. 
 170. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3883 (West 2003). 
 171. CAL. PENAL CODE § 836 (West 2003). 
 172. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3883 (West 2003). 
 173. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 836 (West 2003).  
 174. Immigration and Nationality Act § 275, 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2000). 
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risdiction but not in another, even neighboring, jurisdiction.175 This 
differing enforcement violates the constitutional mandate for uniform 
immigration laws. Though officially there would be only one set of 
federal immigration laws, in reality there would be numerous sets of 
laws, as a result of the differing enforcement among jurisdictions and 
among states. 
 Constitutional arguments aside, what, if anything, is wrong with 
having differing enforcement of immigration laws? Proponents of lo-
cal enforcement argue that any additional enforcement of immigra-
tion laws, even if uneven, is an improvement from the scattered en-
forcement currently being provided by the federal authorities.176 
 But additional enforcement, per se, does not equal good immigra-
tion policy. Knowing that the neighboring authorities do not enforce 
immigration laws, states and localities could use local enforcement to 
discourage the formation of immigrant communities in their jurisdic-
tions. Even legal immigrants could be intimidated from settling in a 
particular area if they believe that they will be subject to racial pro-
filing from local authorities.177 The constitutional rights of these legal 
immigrants to travel could be limited by anti-immigrant sentiment 
from localities.178  
 Additionally, local enforcement would shift at least some immi-
gration policy making power from the federal government to local au-
thorities, with negative implications for the nation’s foreign policy. 
Local authorities could choose to enforce immigration laws in geo-
graphical areas that the federal government, for foreign policy rea-
sons, has chosen not to enforce. For example, federal immigration of-
ficials were strongly criticized for the August 2003 arrest of an un-
documented Mexican family as they were walking to the Mexican 
consulate in San Diego.179 Mexico protested these arrests to the 
United States, arguing that immigration law enforcement so close to 
the consulate prevented Mexican officials from performing their con-
sular duties, including the issuance of the controversial Mexican ID 
cards to its citizens.180 In response, federal officials agreed to stop 
                                                                                                                      
 175. See supra notes 163-74 and accompanying text.  
 176. See Representative Charlie Norwood, Cracking Down on Criminal Illegals, HOUS. 
CHRON., Aug. 15, 2003 (on file with author); JOHN L. MARTIN ET AL., FED’N FOR AM. IM-
MIGRATION REFORM, State of Insecurity: How State and Local Immigration Policies Are 
Undermining Homeland Security, 2-3, available at http://www.fairus.org/news/ News-
Print.cfm?ID=1626&c=55 (last visited Feb. 22, 2004).  
 177. See supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.  
 178. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (holding that constitutional pro-
tections apply to all persons who enter the country); Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 
U.S. 250, 254-55 (1974) (holding that the right to travel is a constitutional right).  
 179. Leonel Sanchez, Mexican Consulate Line Shorter After Family’s Arrest, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB., Aug. 5, 2003, at B3, 2003 WL 660198. 
 180. Id. 
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making arrests close to consulate buildings.181 But if local authorities, 
acting on their inherent authority, decided to enforce immigration 
laws in these politically sensitive areas, the federal government 
would likely encounter problems (either legal or political) in stopping 
this enforcement, though it would be the federal government that 
would face the foreign policy consequences of the enforcement. 
 Moreover, unlike federal enforcement, which critics contend is 
also unevenly and inconsistently applied, local enforcement can never 
be made uniform because of Tenth Amendment restrictions. Though 
the federal government may be able to require states to make their 
enforcement laws uniform through exercise of the Supremacy Clause, 
it cannot “commandeer” state machinery and require local authori-
ties to enforce immigration laws.182 Thus unlike federal enforcement, 
which could be made uniform through legislation and increased fund-
ing, attempts to make local enforcement uniform face insurmount-
able constitutional hurdles. 
 It was this concern for uniform immigration laws that prompted 
the Court of Appeals of New York (the state’s highest court) to strike 
down a state law that terminated state-funded Medicaid benefits for 
certain classes of noncitizens.183 The state argued that federal law, 
namely the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Recon-
ciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), authorized it to discriminate on the 
basis of alienage.184 Acknowledging that federal immigration legisla-
tion is usually subject only to rational basis scrutiny because of the 
federal government’s plenary power in that area, the court nonethe-
less subjected the state law to strict scrutiny analysis.185  
 The court looked at a long line of Supreme Court cases, including 
Graham v. Richardson and Mathews v. Diaz, and concluded that they 
all required a uniform immigration policy.186 Because New York was 
not following a uniform federal immigration policy but rather was de-
ciding for itself whether to deny Medicaid benefits based on alienage, 
New York could not ride on the coattails of federal immigration ple-
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and accompanying text.  
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federal benefits. Id. at 1098 (citing to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1621(d), 1622(a)). 
 185. Id. at 1096. 
 186. Id. at 1096-98.  
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nary power, federal authorization notwithstanding.187 “In the name of 
national immigration policy, it impermissibly authorizes each State 
to decide whether to disqualify many otherwise eligible aliens from 
State Medicaid.”188 The court then concluded that New York’s law vio-
lated equal protection because the state, unlike the federal govern-
ment, has no compelling interest in making distinctions based on 
alienage.189 
 Similarly, because DOJ’s invitation allows local authorities to de-
cide for themselves whether to enforce immigration laws and would 
result in nonuniform immigration policy, it is necessarily unconstitu-
tional. 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 The inherent authority position—that state and local authorities 
have authority as sovereigns to enforce immigration laws—is prob-
lematic for many reasons. Courts that have previously considered the 
related question of local enforcement have focused on preemption and 
the murky task of discerning congressional intent; opponents of local 
enforcement, including police departments and immigrant rights 
groups, have focused on the negative policy implications of having lo-
cal police enforce immigration laws in their communities.  
 But even beyond these important policy and legal problems, the 
inherent authority position faces an insurmountable hurdle in the 
Constitution itself. As demonstrated above, immigration law, as a 
constitutional matter, must be exercised uniformly. The inherent au-
thority position violates that mandate by creating a thousand bor-
ders—the result of allowing local authorities to decide for themselves 
whether to enforce immigration laws and then having those local au-
thorities be bound by different state laws that affect their enforce-
ment authority. The nonuniformity inherent in the inherent author-
ity position is a fatal flaw that dooms DOJ’s invitation for local en-
forcement. 
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